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Executive Summary
The report presents an overview of institutional strategies to deal with the
problem of past atrocities and the main debates and dilemmas raised by these
efforts, as reflected in the transitional justice literature. The picture is complex.
The relationship between the aims of reconciliation and democratisation and
the different measures employed to achieve them – trials, purges, truth
commissions, restorative efforts, reforms, amnesty and amnesia – are
ambiguous and disputed. Moral and theoretical arguments can be made for
each strategy as a road to reconciliation, but in many cases the relationship
can not, or at least has not, been convincingly demonstrated empirically.
Main findings:
· There is no single superior strategy or institutional model for addressing
the problem of past human rights violations. Each case must be addressed
on its own terms. The power context and the nature of the repression are
central factors that need to be taken into consideration in the search for a
suitable approach.
· Timing is important. Optimal institutions for addressing a specific
transitional justice problem is not sufficient, they also need to be
introduced at the right time. A measure that is ruled out at one stage may
be an option later on, and interventions that go on for too long tend to be
politicised.
· Local ownership and legitimacy is crucial, and is often a function of the
process through which the transitional justice institutions are established.
It is in other words, not only a matter of what is done, and when, but how
and by whom. Experience with international and UN engagement in
tribunals and truth commissions is mixed, and the UN factor is difficult to
isolate, but strong and direct international engagement combined with
physical distance appear to make the process of generating legitimacy more
difficult.
· A single strategy is rarely sufficient. In countries that have undergone truth
commission processes, a pressure for trials has resurfaced at a later stage
(Chile, Argentina). In countries starting out with trials, demands for a
truth commission have emerged (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Claims for
compensation are raised in various contexts. And demands for reform are
near universal.
Thus it is clear that each society needs to search, not for the road to
reconciliation, but for paths traversing different parts of the war torn social
terrain. It is equally clear that for most societies traumatised by gross human
rights violations reconciliation is not a destination, but an ongoing process. It
is naive to believe that transitional justice institutions, however sophisticated,
can bring reconciliation once and for all.  The challenge should thus be
conceived not in terms of finding the formula that will deliver reconciliation,
but rather to search for tools and procedures that can facilitate various forms
of reconciliation processes and keep them going.
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Recommendations, research needed
· With the massive resources dedicated to reconciliation processes of various
kinds, there is a need for more empirical research into whether these
strategies achieve their purpose, and which strategies are the most effective.
· More should also be known about how different reconciliation efforts and
processes affect each other on the ground, and how they in fact impact on
democratisation.
· We also need more knowledge about why states chose particular
transitional justice strategies and the factors that influence and restrain
their choice. Some work has been done, focussing in particular on the
power of the former regime to prevent reactions, and the strength of civil
society in pushing for them. Still, there is a need for a better theoretical
framework to help us understand why states – and the international
community – act they way they do. And we need to better understand how
the suitability of different strategies is affected not only by political factors
but also by differences in the cultural context.
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1 Introduction – Roads to Reconciliation1
Political developments over the past two decades have actualised questions of
how societies should deal with past atrocities and injustice in order to move
towards long-term goals of reconciliation and democratic consolidation. In
country after country transitions from authoritarian and repressive rule have
confronted newly established democratic regimes with the challenge of how to
handle the dark chapters of their recent history. The problems are particularly
acute in countries coming out of a bloody civil war or the abyss of genocide,
but at some stage a need to address past human rights violations seems to
surface in most countries with a history of repressive rule.
We also see that in such situations, focus is increasingly set on the need
for reconciliation.2 The need to create a climate in which conflicting parties
can resolve their differences through non-violent means, a political climate
where former enemies may continue to disagree, but nevertheless interact and
communicate on the basis of a shared normative framework and mutual
recognition. This aim, which can be termed political reconciliation, is the focal
point of this report. And while political reconciliation is also relevant relation
to international conflicts, our focus here will be on intra-state processes.
How can reconciliation be brought about? This fundamental question
engages politicians and scholars alike. In this report we seek to take stock of
current knowledge that may contribute towards a better understanding and
possibly some answers. After discussing notions of reconciliation and their
relation to democracy, we analyse the various strategies aiming for
reconciliation in contexts of past repression. In the last part of the report we
address the role of international agents, and particularly the United Nations,
in national reconciliation processes.
Up to the early-1980s there seemed to be basically two alternative
responses to systematic human rights violations. Trials (by domestic courts or
a Nuremberg-type tribunal) or some form of amnesty and public amnesia.
While amnesty and prosecutions remain important responses, we have in latter
years witnessed a proliferation of new strategies to come to grips with the
challenges posed by the need for justice and reconciliation in the shadow of
past injustices. These include truth commissions, administrative purges and
prohibitions on holding public office, access to secret files, reparations and
other forms of compensation, symbolic restoration, civic education, and
projects to advance peace-building, socio-cultural integration and psycho-
social healing, as well as social, political and legal reforms. The strategies may
be grouped in different categories according to the underlying logic:
First, there are strategies focussing on the need for justice. The basic
assumption is that lasting reconciliation requires that perpetrators responsible
for past atrocities are held accountable and punished for their crimes.
                                           
1 I would like to thank Elin Skaar, who leads CMI’s project of Reconciliation and
Democratisation of which this report forms part, for valuable contributions.
2 While after the Second World War, war crimes tribunals were justified by reference to the
need for justice – such institutions are now held to serve the broader goal of reconciliation.
See section 8 below.
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Institutional mechanisms for meting out justice include prosecution and
sentencing in domestic courts or tribunals, in international tribunals, in joint
international and domestic tribunals, or in foreign courts. Administrative
procedures to lock perpetrators and collaborators out of jobs and positions in
public institutions, and various forms of public exposure and social shaming,
are weaker mechanisms that nevertheless function according to the logic of
retributive justice.
A second type of responses centres on the need for truth. It is based on
the assumption that knowledge about what actually happened in the past and
who were responsible for planning and executing crimes and abuses, can be a
road to reconciliation. Institutional mechanisms to this effect are mainly
different forms of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry (but also
testimony in trials). The operation of such commissions varies greatly. Some
rely on open hearings, others on secret testimony. In some cases names of
perpetrators are released, in others only acts and patterns of abuses are
reported. Most commissions rely on voluntary co-operation, but some have
quasi-judicial powers, such as the power to grant amnesty in return for truth,
to subpoena witnesses, search premises and seize evidence.
A third category concentrates on restoration and rehabilitation. These
responses are based on the presumption that for reconciliation to take place
the physical, psychological and social damages caused by the violations and
injustice of the past must be acknowledged and healed. Reconciliation requires
that the victims' situation change. Mechanisms to bring about restorative
justice include various forms of compensation, provision of physical and
mental health services, symbolic restoration, public apologies and various
efforts to advance social integration and peace building at community level.
Then there are the responses focusing on reform. The underlying
premise is that reconciliation requires a focus on the future, rather than on
what happened in the past. The best route is to concentrate efforts on securing
an institutional framework that can prevent human rights abuses in the future,
and promote social justice by creating reasonable terms of social co-operation.
Constitutional reform, economic reform, reforms of the justice system, and in
sectors such as education, health and housing, are here seen as more important
to reconciliation than any attempt to respond to past injustice.
Public amnesia and amnesty (or impunity due to inaction) for crimes
committed by the former regime may be part of a reform strategy, but does
not necessarily follow. To do nothing – or actively pursue a strategy of
oblivion through amnesty legislation and public amnesia – should thus be seen
as a separate type of response to the problem of past atrocities. The reasoning
is that if the wounds of the past are left alone they will heal with time.
While it is useful analytically to distinguish between these concerns for
justice, truth, restoration, reform, and oblivion – it should be borne in mind
that in actual politics strategies and institutional mechanisms often seek to
include all or several of these. Figure 1 below illustrates the range of responses
to the challenges of reconciliation and democratisation.
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Figure 1
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- Rehabilitation, restoration
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- Administration of justice
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Vibrant scholarly debates accompany – and partly also drive – the
development of new responses to past human rights abuses. The academic
literature on transitional justice as this field of research has come to be known,
is substantial and growing, spanning both case analysis, comparative and
theoretical work in academic disciplines such as law, political science,
psychology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology and history. We will outline
some of the most important issues and debates, highlight central insights and
dilemmas emanating from this growing body of literature, and point to areas
where more research is needed. Taking reconciliation as our focal point we
address the following sets of questions:
- On democracy and reconciliation. What do we mean by reconciliation?
What is the relationship between reconciliation and democracy?
- On justice and reconciliation. What is the relationship between
retrospective/retributive justice (accountability and punishment for past
crimes) and reconciliation? Is the former a precondition for the latter – or
are there circumstances under which justice is contrary to national
reconciliation and democratic consolidation? How, and under what terms
can and should perpetrators be brought to justice?
- On truth and reconciliation. What is the relationship between truth and
reconciliation? Is knowledge – establishment of 'the truth' – a precondition
for reconciliation, or necessarily conducive in this regard? Is official truth-
seeking an alternative to justice?
- On restoration and reconciliation. What is the relationship between
‘restorative justice’ (compensation, rehabilitation, recognition, healing) and
reconciliation? What forms of restorative justice are most likely to advance
reconciliation?
- On institutional reform and reconciliation. Is institutional reform to
prevent future human rights abuses, advance social justice and create
reasonable terms of political and social interaction, more important for
reconciliation than 'reckoning with the past'? Are the two contrary? And,
if so, under what conditions should reform take precedence?
- On oblivion, time and reconciliation. How does time affect reconciliation
efforts? Does reconciliation require that we forget the injustice of the past?
And does time bring oblivion? If the mere passing of time is the best cure
for wounds of past repression, does it mean that societies should ‘do
nothing’ in the way of transitional justice and accept impunity?
The questions addressed here have important policy implications. The
different policies advocated or implemented to bring about reconciliation are
implicitly or explicitly based on assumptions about these relationships. So
while these are theoretically complex questions to which there are few clear
answers, it is crucial that practitioners and policy makers confront them. In
particular, it is important to take stock of what we currently know about how
different transitional justice strategies impact on processes of reconciliation
and democratisation, and why states choose particular strategies.
It is also important to address the role of the international community
in relation to reconciliation processes. International actors and organisations
(particularly the UN) have sought to contribute to national reconciliation
processes through a range of efforts, such as the establishment of war crime
C M I
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tribunals, truth commissions, and support for judicial reform. What are the
impacts of these efforts? And what determines the response of the UN?
The report addresses these questions, but does not provide firm
conclusions. Rather, it seeks to provide categories and tools to systematise and
critically reflect on these issues as they apply to particular political situations.
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2 Democratisation and Reconciliation
What do we understand by reconciliation, and how does it relate to
democratisation? Reconciliation is a multifaceted concept that refers to
processes of different kinds and taking place at various levels. In brief
reconciliation
- is about individuals forgiving each other.
- is about how societies torn apart by internal conflict mend their social
fabric and reconstitute the 'desire to live together'.3
- is about peaceful coexistence and social stability.
- may refer to an ambitious goal of creating a shared comprehensive vision
of a common future (and/or a common past) –
- or to a situation where former enemies may continue to disagree, but
respect each other as equal citizens in a democratic society.
Individual reconciliation regards not only how people come to terms with
each other at the interpersonal level after traumatic periods or events, but also
how they come to terms with their own past experience and present condition.
Individual reconciliation has primarily been the domain of psychology and
religious counselling. In this literature reconciliation is primarily understood a
therapeutic goal.4 The psychological conception of reconciliation with its
connotations of healing and restoration has influenced thinking on
reconciliation beyond the interpersonal and individual level. Similarly,
theological thought on reconciliation, related to ideas about confession,
forgiveness and catharsis, has influenced conceptions in the transition
literature as well as the political rhetoric.5
At a collective level reconciliation regards “how a society torn apart by
internal conflict can mend its social fabric” (Skaar 1999a:121). How it can
"reweave thread by thread the fabric of that society and reconstitute… the
'desire to live together'" (Jorda 2001). Reconciliation in this sense refers to
processes at the level of local communities, as well as between groups at
national or regional level.6
 Research on reconciliation processes at the community level has
primarily been the focus of anthropology and sociology, and is understood in
terms of processes of inclusion, acceptance and forgiveness. National
reconciliation – which is the main concern of the current report – has been the
main focal point in the disciplines of political science, history and law.
                                           
3 Jorda (2001), see also Skaar (1999a).
4 See for example Basoglu (1992), Cienfuegos and Monelli (1983), Sveaass (2000), Sveaass
and Lavik (2000).
5 This is most evident in the discourse surrounding the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), where theologians were prominent in the conception, as well as the
running of the Commission. We will not, however, venture into the terrain of theological
thinking, only refer to it where it is manifested in other academic or political debates.
6 Reconciliation is also relevant in relation to international conflicts, but at noted above this
report focuses on intra-state processes.
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Within the literature on national reconciliation, it is useful to
distinguish between 'thinner' and 'thicker' notions of reconciliation, with non-
violent coexistence as a minimal definition and, at the other end of the scale, a
shared comprehensive vision of a common future (Crocker 2000: 108).  In
between there are conceptions of reconciliation as the creation of conditions
where former enemies may continue to disagree, but respect each other as
citizens.7 It is this latter notion – which we have earlier referred to as political
reconciliation – that is our main focus.
Between whom reconciliation is needed depends on the nature of
past repression
Besides the importance of realising that reconciliation takes place at different
levels – individual, interpersonal, local and national – it is also necessary to
address the question of between whom reconciliation needed. This is usually
understood as a matter between victims and perpetrators, either individually
or between conflicting groups (where there may be victims and perpetrators
on each side). But whether this is the most relevant focus, depends on the
nature of the repression under the former regime. In some contexts a
repressive and unjust social and political system victimised large sections of
the population while other groups benefited. Here it may be more relevant to
focus on reconciliation between victims and beneficiaries, rather than only on
a relatively small number of perpetrators of gross human rights violations and
their immediate victims.8
Where there has been what Tina Rosenberg has called a criminal
regime,9 as opposed to a regime of criminals there may be a need for a wider
process to reconcile the population and the State apparatus. The need for
reconciliation is particularly acute with regard to the army, police and
intelligence agencies responsible for the most overt human rights abuses, but it
may also be called for in relation to the bureaucracy more generally. In
societies coming out of a violent and repressive past there is not only the need
to reconcile individuals and groups as such, but also to reconcile conflicting
understandings of this part of their history, its meaning for the present, and
for the political direction to be taken.
                                           
7 "Among other things this means that people hear each other out, enter into a give-and-take
with each other about matters of public policy, build on areas of common concern, and forge
compromises with which all can live" (Crocker 2000: 108). Other conception of
reconciliation along these lines are what Gutmann and Thompson (2000) refer to as
democratic reciprocity, and what Mark Osiel (1997) terms liberal (or discursive) social
solidarity.
8 This is forcefully argued by, among others, Mahmood Mamdani in relation to the South
African context (Mamdani 1996).
9 A criminal regime is one in which the repression is integral to the regime itself, a function of
its laws and regular operation (such as in former communist regimes in Eastern Europe),
whereas in a regime of criminals the repression is in breach of the laws of the land (Rosenberg
1996). See also Kritz (1995), Rosenberg (1991), Rosenberg (1999).
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How is reconciliation related to democracy?
The relationship between reconciliation and democracy depends on how
reconciliation is conceived and the level at which it is addressed.10 In the
literature on national reconciliation the two are usually seen as intimately
related, almost to the point of being analytically indistinguishable. This holds
regardless of whether national reconciliation is conceived as a process through
which a common set of values is developed upon which a democratic society
can be built – or it is equated with social stability and peaceful coexistence
within a democratic framework of government. Reconciliation is seen as a
precondition for, or integral aspect of, democratisation in the sense that
democratic consolidation requires and involves the forging of a significant
degree of national reconciliation. And lasting reconciliation is held to be
possible only within a democratic framework.
It is often (implicitly) assumed that all reconciliation processes in a
society are mutually reinforcing. Reconciliation at the individual level and at
the level of local communities is generally held to be necessary for (or at least
conducive to) national reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy,
understood as a democratic form of government at the national level. Such
assumptions are, however, often founded more on moral and theoretical
arguments than on empirical evidence. The extent to which a process
addressing the need for individual psychological healing is conducive towards
national reconciliation and democratisation is, however, an empirical
question, and must be established on the basis of each particular case.
Do processes of individual healing match what a nation must
undergo?
In the literature, reconciliation processes of different kinds and at different
levels tend to be seen as closely related – reasoning derived from experience
with individual psychological and religious counselling is applied to debates
on national reconciliation. But reconciliation in the sense of psychological
healing and closure is very different from national reconciliation, whether
understood in the 'thin' or 'thick' sense. For analytical purposes – as well as
for practical policy-making purposes – it is important not to conflate the
different processes by regarding them as essentially the same phenomenon,
and assume that all forms of reconciliation can be advanced through similar
processes. Whether "the process for individual healing matches what an entire
nation must undergo" is an empirical question (Minow 2000: 240). Although
these assumptions are not easily tested, it is crucial that they are critically
examined – particularly given their role in policy decisions.
The same holds for other fundamental and oft-repeated assumptions in the
scholarly and political debate on transitional justice. ‘Justice is a precondition
for reconciliation’. 'Reconciliation requires that victims be compensated.'
'Truth is a precondition for reconciliation'. ‘Reconciliation requires oblivion
and a focus on the future rather than the past.’ Such propositions cannot be
taken at face value, but must be scrutinised to see how, and under what
conditions, they may be expected to hold, and to what extent they are
                                           
10 It also depends on how democracy is conceived. We will not go into a discussion of different
conceptions of democracy here, but this can be found for example in Held (1996).
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supported by available empirical evidence.11 In the following sections we seek
to untangle the arguments and discuss how, according to current knowledge,
reconciliation is best advanced.  Again, the aim is not to provide general
answers, but rather to provide 'tools for thought' – an overview of the field,
and a set of categories to guide reflection of these issues in practical political
decision-making.
                                           
11 For each of these propositions a strong moral and ethical case can be – and is – made, and it
seems as if their normative force is converted into assumptions about empirical relationships.
It should be noted that a substantial part of the transitional justice literature consists of, or
proceeds from, normative theory, and normative arguments appear to be significant in
relation to policy formulation nationally as well as internationally.
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3 Justice and Reconciliation
In accordance with basic norms of criminal justice, people responsible for
gross human rights abuses such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, murder, torture
and rape, should be held accountable and punished for their actions. What
form of punishment that should be meted out for crimes where no measure
can be adequate in any real sense of the term, is disputed, likewise what
should count as extenuating circumstances. But that victims and survivors
have a moral right to see perpetrators brought to justice is hardly
controversial. According to influential interpretations of international law they
also have a legal right to justice for gross human rights abuses, even in cases
where such acts are not illegal according to domestic jurisdiction. There are, of
course, debates both regarding the moral or legal justification for successor
trials.12 Our main concern, however, is not whether prosecution is justifiable,
but if and under what conditions it is conducive to reconciliation. For these
purposes it is sufficient to note that there is a strong prima facie case for
bringing perpetrators to justice.
It is often argued that reconciliation requires justice, in the sense of
accountability and punishment for former perpetrators.13 The link between
justice and reconciliation is substantiated with reference to reconciliation
processes both at the individual and social level. Findings from psychological
research indicate that bringing perpetrators to justice is often vital to
reconciliation at the individual level, that it enables victims of human rights
abuses to attain closure and restore healthy relations toward others, and their
own selves. At the social level, bringing perpetrators to justice demonstrates a
clear break with the past and responds to and acknowledges a sense of justice
in the population which is needed to build trust in the new social order.
Conversely, we are warned that failing to prosecute past atrocities creates a
culture of impunity that is detrimental to the rule of law and to reconciliation
in the sense of peaceful coexistence in a democratic system of government.
And it is noted that countries where amnesties are granted often experience
high and rising crime rates.
The merits of retributive justice as a means to advance reconciliation is,
however, not undisputed. It is frequently argued that to impose justice on
                                           
12 Successor trials prosecuting acts that were legal according to the laws of the country at the
time they were committed have been held to violate principles of due process and the rule of
law. This was a large debate in the aftermath of the Nuremberg trials after WWII. As human
rights norms have come to be widely accepted as principles of international law, prosecution
for gross violations of human rights is less controversial as a case of retrospective legislation.
Other problems of due process may, however, arise. For example, will prosecution, given the
time and costs involved, in most cases be selective, which means that decisions to prosecute
may be vulnerable to criticisms of arbitrariness and/or political bias.
13 This is normally seen in terms of criminal justice – the prosecution and sentencing of
individual perpetrators in courts of law or international tribunals, and forms the main focus
on the discussions in this section. Other means to impose accountability and punishment
include sanctions imposed through administrative justice, purges in the civil service,
prohibitions on holding publish office, and public shaming. These approaches have their own
advantages and shortcomings and will be commented on in due course.
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members of the former regime or their agents is likely to increase tension and
social conflicts in ways that prevent national reconciliation.
Among those who hold that justice for past crimes is conducive to
reconciliation, and thus in principle desirable, there are different views
regarding the circumstances under which it is a feasible strategy. There are
also different views regarding the form the pursuit of justice should take in
different contexts, and on whether alternative approaches are as, or more,
likely to advance reconciliation – in particular given the costs involved in
conducting trials.
Under what circumstances can and should perpetrators be
brought to justice?
Chances for successful prosecution of those responsible for past abuses
depends on political and institutional factors as well as the nature and scale of
abuses.
Political factors – most notably the balance of power between the new
regime and representatives of the former – may make prosecution untenable.
To prosecute representatives of former regimes for human rights abuses is a
feasible option only where the former regime has been defeated or so severely
discredited that they no longer pose a viable threat, military or otherwise
(Skaar 1999b). This was the case with the Nazis after the Second World War,
where successor trials were held in a number of countries. A more recent
example is the Derg trials in Ethiopia, trying alleged perpetrators from
Mengistu's military dictatorship.
Where the former regime has retained some support, or managed to
control the transition process, prosecution is unlikely. In the latter case,
amnesty guarantees are normally demanded by the former regime as a
condition for reforms, and concessions granted in the transition process may
thus effectively block recourse to prosecution, as happened in several Latin
American countries. If the previous regime has retained significant support in
the population and/or in the armed forces, this is likely to deter prosecution
for fear of increasing conflicts or the chances of a military coup. Prosecution is
also unlikely if atrocities occurred in a context of armed conflict or civil war
with massive violations on both sides – particularly if the former antagonists
now co-operate in the new political system, as is the case for example in
Mozambique.
Even if political considerations do not prevent the new regime from
meting out justice for past crimes, the institutional conditions may be lacking.
In many cases the domestic judiciary and the entire justice system is so weak
or compromised by its links to the former regime, that it is unlikely to have
the ability to investigate and conduct trials in a way that is perceived to be
fair. Often the documentation needed to prosecute has also been destroyed or
cannot be located. There is also the problem of scale. In most cases – but
particularly where the number of perpetrators is overwhelming, as in
Mozambique and Rwanda, the capacity of the criminal justice system to hold
perpetrators accountable is bound to be limited (even without taking into
account the dismal state of the justice system in these countries).
In yet other cases, the nature of the abuses makes criminal justice a
difficult route. Prosecution is most feasible as a strategy for transitional justice
C M I
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where a relatively limited number of perpetrators are responsible for clearly
identifiable criminal acts against individual victims. Particularly when these
are criminal also by the standards of the regime itself, and can be linked to the
former regime by relatively clear lines of command.
This is most typical of the pattern of repression in Latin American
military regimes. In Eastern Europe repression had a broader scope and was to
a larger extent incrementally implemented though bureaucratic procedures,
which makes it more problematic to use criminal trials to impose
accountability and punishment. But neither the political, institutional or
structural obstacles to justice are absolute. Different strategies have been
sought to overcome them so that those responsible for past atrocities can be
held to account and punished for their crimes. An overview of different
institutional strategies is provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Institutionalisation of Transitional Justice
Domestic institutions Mixed institutions International initiatives
International Criminal
Court
(Enabling mandate
adopted, but not ratified)
Permanent
judicial
structures
Trials in ordinary
courts by domestic
judiciary
(Ethiopia, Argentina, Nazi
trials in Norway and other
countries after WWII)
Trials by judiciary
under UN-
administration
(East Timor)
Trials in foreign courts
Spain (- Chile)
Belgium (- Rwanda)
Ad-hoc
judicial
structures
Ad hoc domestic
tribunals
(Rwanda)
Joint tribunals –
domestic &
international judges
(Cambodia, Sierra Leone)
International ad-hoc
tribunals
(Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda)
Administrative justice
- Purges, prohibitions
(Czechoslovakia, Eastern
Europe)
Shaming – exposure
through truth
commissions naming
perpetrators
(South Africa)
Non-judicial
measures
Shaming  – exposure
through access to files
(East Germany)
Shaming – joint truth
commissions
Shaming –
internationally
organised truth
commissions
(El Salvador)
What are the options?
The normal mechanism for delivering criminal justice is the domestic justice
system – to prosecute and try offenders before the normal courts of law or
some form of special tribunal. Where this is feasible, it is widely regarded as
the preferred option, though there may be factors that make this an impossible
or unlikely route to justice.
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The most unfavourable context in this regard is where the position and
continued support for the past regime and/or groups responsible for past
human rights violations, give them a significant disruptive potential. Where
this is the case the new regime will not go for trials, even where there is a
pressure for justice in civil society (Skaar 1999b).14
In the past few years we have, however, seen considerable activity on the
part of international actors, applying various forms of pressure to affects the
internal balance of power, or circumvent it. The attempt to have Chile's
former dictator Augusto Pinochet tried before a Spanish court is well known.
In this case a domestic courts in one country is trying citizens (including
former leaders) of another country for particular crimes (war crimes, crimes
against humanity) committed on the latter country’s own territory. This
introduces a new mechanism to impose justice: trials in foreign courts.15
A second strategy by the international community to hold former
regimes accountable for past atrocities is illustrated by the recent successful
effort to pressure Serbia to hand over Slobodan Milosevic to the War Crimes
Tribunal in The Hague: international tribunals, created and authorised by the
UN Security Council.
Both of these strategies are in the process of being more firmly
institutionalised. The former (trials in foreign courts) is provided for and taken
up by several countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, the US). And the
process to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) is
underway. It is, however, a question whether such processes – where
perpetrators are tried far away from the country where the crimes took place
and with large sections of the population rejecting the process, or viewing it
with considerable scepticism – can contribute to national reconciliation.
A third strategy is joint tribunals, where domestic and international
judges work side by side. This is the mechanism set to be implemented in
Cambodia, where the US in particular has exerted considerable pressure in
order to bring the Khmer Rouge leaders to trial.16 To establish a co-operation
between foreign judges and the domestic courts is also the route taken in
Indonesia and Sierra Leone.  It can be seen as response to the problem of
creating domestic ownership of and legitimacy for an internationally driven
process, while at the same time compensating for problems in the domestic
justice system.
International tribunals, trials in foreign courts, and joint tribunals are
strategies that seek to surmount obstacles created by the domestic political
balance of power, as well as to overcome institutional problems of lacking
infrastructure and judicial independence. The latter is also addressed by
various strategies to strengthen the domestic justice apparatus, through
technical and financial assistance, training, and support for judicial reform.
                                           
14 Domestic actors can overcome formal obstacles, such as amnesties granted prior to or as
part of the transition if the power position of the former regime changes.
15 This is gaining ground, with Belgium's trials of Rwandan war criminals being an even
clearer case, since Belgian individuals were not involved on either side.
16 As of February 2002, it is unclear whether and when a joint tribunal will in fact be
implemented, after a breakdown in the negotiations between the Cambodian government and
the UN. According to the previously agreed framework, domestic judges were to be in
majority on the tribunal, but in order for decisions to stand, an international judge would
have to side with the majority.
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Problems related to the scale of the abuses – overwhelming numbers of
perpetrators and criminal acts – are sought met by selective prosecution of the
so-called ‘big fish’, i.e. the planners and administratively responsible, rather
than the foot soldiers.
Capacity problems have also been addressed by establishing an
alternative domestic system outside the courts, where alleged perpetrators are
tried (Rwanda). This has, however, been criticised for not meeting standards
of due process and for creating a system where the foot soldiers are sentenced
much more severely than the 'big fish'17.
Lustration – administrative purges and prohibitions on holding public
office – is another route taken to ensure some form of retributive justice where
the scale or nature of abuses have made prosecution difficult (because they are
linked to the very structure and operation of bureaucratic and social
structures).18 Other weaker mechanisms rely on social shaming. The names of
perpetrators and the nature of their crimes are disclosed through truth
commissions processes or by granting victims access to secret files.19
We will return to some of these mechanisms later. In the following,
when addressing the effects of justice on reconciliation, we will concentrate on
the paradigmatic case: criminal justice through some form of domestic or
international trial.
Is justice a precondition for reconciliation – or is it contrary to
national reconciliation and democratic consolidation?
Besides the practical, and in some cases also moral, problems involved in
meeting out criminal justice to those responsible for past human rights abuses,
it is also a question of whether this – even when feasible – is conducive to
reconciliation.
There is a range of positions on this issue. The disagreements are due
both to different assumptions about the effects of imposing criminal justice,
and to differences in the way reconciliation is understood. Some argue that
true reconciliation is impossible unless those responsible for past atrocities are
brought to justice – that a culture of impunity is the main obstacle to long
term reconciliation in the sense of creating social conditions for mutual
                                           
17 For a discussion about how different categories of the population are related to and affected
by past abuses see Adam (2001).
18 Surveillance by the secret police was common in most of the former East European regimes,
such as in East Germany, where a quarter of the population was registered in the Stasi
archives. In these countries lustration laws were passed, first in the former Czechoslovakia
and later in most Eastern European regimes. These banned former officials and police
collaborators from higher political (and certain other) positions for a period of time and
specifying legal criteria to identify them. See Christie (2000), Hayner (2001), Rosenberg
(1999). These responses have been widely criticised for lack of due process safeguards. It is,
however, argued that as far as punishment goes, responses by way of administrative justice
and public law are more feasible than trials in former communist regimes, where human rights
violations were often committed incrementally by ‘the system’ (anonymous bureaucrats)
against a large number of suspected dissidents. As noted above, trials are more feasible when
more easily identifiable agents have committed criminal act against specifically targeted
individuals, as is the case in many Latin American countries (Rosenberg 1999).
19 In East Germany the Stasi Archives were opened and citizens were given access to their files.
This had a similar effect as lustration laws in that a large number public servants at were
dismissed and office-holders various levels discredited. See Christie (2000), Rosenberg (1996).
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tolerance between citizens of a democratic state.20 Others hold that the
prosecution of offenders rarely contributes to reconciliation, but rather is
likely to lead to renewed conflict and violence. Yet others hold a position
somewhere in between, where the benefits of trials for reconciliation are seen
to be dependent on the particular nature of each social and political context.
Those warning against prosecuting crimes of former regimes fear that it
might destabilise a fragile peace and increase tension and violence. As noted
earlier, the likelihood that this might happen is particularly great if those
responsible for human rights violations in the past, continue to hold
significant power or social support. This has been the main argument against
trials in Latin American countries coming out of repressive military
dictatorships, and where the military continued to be a potential threat.
Similarly, in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge was seen to have
considerable disruptive potential, fears were that prosecutions would bring the
horror back. In countries such as South Africa and Mozambique, where those
politically responsible for past violations continue to have a significant base of
social support, it was feared that attempts to prosecute them might spark a
(new) civil war. In these cases prosecution is seen as an immediate threat to
reconciliation in the sense of peace (absence of violence). While there may be
different views of how realistic such a scenario is in a particular case, few
would totally ignore the political dynamics and advice prosecutions in a
situation where this is seen to constitute a real, grave security threat.
In cases – or at times – where prosecution is unlikely to result in
immediate threats to the new regime, views are more divided.21 Some,
nevertheless, advise against trials, on the grounds that the likely effect will be
to further divide the society by creating martyrs of victors' justice, feeding
sentiments of collective victimisation, contrary to the aims of reconciliation.
Others hold that the positive long-term effects of ending impunity offset the
possible negative effects in the short and medium term. It is also argued that
reconciliation is necessary for (or greatly conducive to) reconciliation at the
individual level – by prosecuting those responsible for past human rights
abuses victims are recognised, the wrongs they suffered are acknowledged and
responsibility is allocated, which may bring closure and healing.22
As we have seen, the purposes of successor trials are manifold: to
demarcate the boundaries of the new legal order and signal respect for the rule
of law by ending impunity; to establish the truth about particular crimes; to
establish accountability; to acknowledge wrongs done; to punish (retribution);
and to recognise the rights of victims and in certain conditions compensate
them. Given the problems that in many cases are raised if former perpetrators
are brought to justice, and the ambivalent effects on reconciliation, much
effort has gone into the search for other mechanisms that can fill some of the
                                           
20 This is the position held by most Human Rights NGOs such as Amnesty International,
advocating trials in foreign countries for perpetrators who are not brought to justice in their
home countries.
21 The time dimension is very important. The relative strength and position of the former
regime/ perpetrators changes over time, as does other aspects of the social context affecting
the likelihood and impact of successor trials. See discussion in section 7 below.
22 This is a major argument for trials in the psychological literature, and has been central in
the Latin American context.
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same purpose without the practical problems and potential disruptive effects
of trials.
Those who reject or seek alternatives to criminal justice more suited to
advance reconciliation in particular contexts, often argue that the element of
punishment (retributive justice) should be avoided or downplayed. What
matters to reconciliation is primarily knowledge about what happened, steps
to rectify the harm suffered by victims (restorative justice) and to create
conditions preventing human rights violations in the future (prospective
justice). These aims, it is argued, can also – and possibly better – be achieved
by other means.
C M I
17
4 Truth and Reconciliation
As noted above, a central aim of successor trials is to establish the truth about
the crimes of the past – what happened and who were responsible. Among
those who reject trials as a suitable road to reconciliation, generally or in
particular contexts, it is a widespread understanding that to bring out the
truth is a precondition for reconciliation.23 This idea is in fact a central dogma
underlying much of the contemporary debate on transitional justice. But what
evidence is there to support this claim? In what sense is truth a precondition
for reconciliation? And through which means can the truth be established?
While some argue that the legal process, with its procedures of cross-
examination and evaluation of evidence, is superior with regard to establishing
the truth about past crimes, others hold that the narrow focus of the legal
process produces too limited a truth. It can, a best, uncover elements of
forensic truth – about whether a particular person did or didn’t commit
particular acts against a particular victim at a particular time and place.24
Other aspects of the truth about the past – why the crimes happened, the
political strategy behind them, the social and cultural dynamics enabling them,
the effects on the victims and society more broadly – are not captured. The
acknowledgement of the victims and their experience provided by court
processes is limited and unlikely to have a restorative effect, as those who
testify are only asked for particular aspects of their experience, and may have
to undergo hostile inquiries. A notable type of new institutions has developed
in the past few decades, responding to the shortcomings discussed here, and
capable of uncovering truth in contexts where trials have been ruled out,
namely truth commissions. These are the focus of the present section, where
we present an overview of the truth commissions carried out so far. When
discussing the potential benefits of – and limits of – the truth commission
approach, we take as our point of departure what has come to be seen as ‘the
model’ case, namely the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Truth commissions – an overview
Truth commissions are institutions outside of the judicial apparatus that have
been established by a government or intergovernmental institution to uncover
evidence about abuses committed under a previous regime or during a civil
war. They are non-judicial bodies in the sense that they do not have the power
to punish perpetrators by imposing legal sanctions. The Focus is on victims
and their stories of past human rights violations. The names of these
institutions vary, as do their scope and modes of operation. Rather than
consider truth commissions as a unified response to the problems of past
crimes, this should be seen as a range of distinct strategies. Table 4.1 provides
                                           
23 There is also a separate argument made by many human rights activists for an inherent right
to truth, seen to exist in international human rights law, arising from the obligation of states
to investigate and punish violations of human rights. See Kritz (1995: 230).
24 For a discussion of various forms of truth relevant to truth commissions (forensic truth,
personal/narrative truth, dialogical truth, restorative truth) see Boraine (2000b). See also
Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000).
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an overview of the main dimensions on which truth commissions differ, and
the range of variation.
Table 4.1 Truth commissions – institutional choices
Institutional
feature
Range of variation
Process of creating
commission
Executive decision – Parliamentary process – Civil society input– Internationally driven
Composition Partisan (new regime) – Politically balanced – ’Neutral’ – International
Resources
          Source
Small budget, no staff – Staff of several hundred, with ditto budget
Domestic budget not guaranteed – Domestic guaranteed budget – International donor
funding
Time of operation 6 months – Set time limit of up to 3 years – Unspecified
Mandate
      “Even-handed”?
Narrow (few forms of human rights violations/short period) – Wide (all violations/long
period)
Violations by one party only (former regime) – By the two main parties – By all sides
Amnesty provisions Blanket amnesty – Conditional amnesty (upon disclosure) – No amnesty –  TC +
Prosecution
Investigation
          Hearings
Few/weak powers (voluntary co-operation) – Strong powers (subpoena, search &
seizure)
Secret – In camera – Public – Widely publicised
Reporting Secret report – Public, perpetrators not named – Perpetrators named – Widely published
Policy
recommendations
None – Advisory – Obligatory
Compared to trials, truth commissions generally provide a more
supportive environment for victims. They also provide for a richer narrative
and social truth, an interpreted truth that not only establishes what happened
in the past, but also the context and meaning of these violations.25 Proponents
of truth commissions hold that this, as a general rule, render them a more
appropriate route to reconciliation than quests for criminal justice. Others
argue that a broader truth commission process should supplement criminal
justice trough trials. Yet others endorse truth commissions as a second best
option in contexts where trials are not feasible. In sum, this has resulted in a
                                           
25 Unlike trials, which "focus on particular individuals and their conduct in particular
moments in time, with decisions of guilt or non-guilt"… (Minow 2000: 299), truth
commissions seek to establish the broader patterns of violations and their causes.
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rapidly growing interest for truth commissions as an institutional mechanism
to deal with the problems of transitional justice.
The first major truth commission was established in Argentina in 1983,
and by the turn of the century around 20 commission had completed their
work or were underway, most of them in Latin American and African
countries.26 An overview of the main truth commissions is provided in Table
4.2.27 As indicated in Table 4.1 their mandates and powers, resources and
modes of operation have varied greatly. The tendency has been that the
commissions have expanded over time, both in terms of resources and powers.
In Latin America, where many of the early truth commissions were
established, the operations were generally small in terms of staff and
conducted within a short time frame (6-12 months).28 Statements were heard
in closed chambers – sometimes the whole process was conducted in secret.
The commissions were normally established by and reported to the President.
In most cases perpetrators were not named, or the names were not made
public. In some cases, publication of the report was long delayed, or was never
made public at all. Besides reporting on the abuses covered by their mandate
(which was often limited to narrow categories such as disappearances or
deaths in detention, excluding serious and often more frequent violations such
as torture, lengthy detentions and forced exile), the commissions were
frequently asked to recommend reforms. The commissions in some cases also
identified victims and survivors who would later qualify for compensation.
                                           
26 The first Latin American truth commission was established in Bolivia in 1982, but due to
lack of resources it disbanded after a couple of years without producing a report. For an
overview of truth commissions see Hayner (2001), Kritz (1995). On Latin American truth
commission see also Popkin and Rohtarriaza (1995).
27 The main source is Hayner (2001). Definitions of ”truth commissions” differ. We only
include commissions set up by a government or the United Nations to investigate abuses
under a former regime or during a civil war. We thus exclude:
- Commissions of inquiry by regimes into abuse under their own rule, such as the commission
set down by Idi Amin in Uganda (1974) to investigate abuses during the first year of his reign,
and the Zimbabwe Commission of Inquiry into government repression in Matableland
(1985).
- Similar commissions set down by non-state parties, such as the ANCs commissions of
inquiry into human rights violations in their own camps (1992 and 1993).
- Commissions of inquiry by non-state agents (human rights NGOs, domestic or
international). This is normally not included in definitions of truth commissions, but there are
exceptions. The Rwandan commission, created and funded by international NGOs in 1992 is
often included, as the president had acknowledged it and the parties had agreed to establish a
truth commission.
28 For a comparison of truth commissions in terms of resources and responsibilities see Hayner
(2001: 318-322), Kritz (1995: 251-253).
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Truth Commissions
· Bolivia (1982-84), National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances established by the
President. 8 commissioners, representative of a cross section of society. Mandate limited to
disappearances, excluding torture, lengthy detention etc. Support staff of 6, limited financial support
from government. Investigated 155 cases (1967-1982). Disbanded after 2 years without producing
report. Trials against former officials were instigated in mid 1980s.
· Argentina (1983-84) National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons. Established by the
President. 13 commissioners, staff of 60. 9 months duration. Narrow focus, mandated to investigate
disappearances (8960 cases) by the former military regime (1976-83). (Victims of torture or prolonged
detention interviewed and included in report, but not defined as victims, significant violations
excluded.) Report Nunca Más published in 1985 and widely distributed. Names of perpetrators not
made public, but leaked.  Material later used for purposes of compensation and in trials against the
military regime. Prosecutions were subsequently halted and pardons given.
· Uruguay 1985 (Investigative Commission on the Situation of ’ Disappeared’ People and Its Causes)
established by Parliament. Around 9 commissioners worked for 7 months. Mandate limited to
disappearances during 11 years of military rule, excluding more prevalent abuses (torture, lengthy
detention etc.) Reported on 164 disappearances and evidence of security force involvement.  Forwarded
this to the Supreme Court, but this has not resulted in prosecution. Public, but not widely distributed
report.
· Uganda (1986-95) Commission of Inquiry into violations of human rights, established by the
President. Broad mandate, investigating human rights abuses by public officials (1962-86). 608
deponents. 6 commissioners and 5-10 staff, operated for 9 years with progressively deteriorating
funding. Presented findings, conclusions and recommendations in 1994.
· Nepal (1990-91) Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Pnchayet
Period, established by the Prime Minister. During its year of operation 4 commissioners investigated
100 cases occurring between 1961 and 1990. The 1991 report was made public in 1994. Perpetrators
were not named.
· Chile (1990-91) National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation established by the President. 8
commissioners, balanced between the parties, were tasked with investigating disappearances (3428),
killings, torture resulting in death and kidnappings by both sides of the conflict (1973-1990).
Commission operated for 9 months and had a staff of 60. Investigated 2920 cases in depth. The 1991
report was made public, but perpetrators were not named. Material was used to identify victims for
compensation. 1978 amnesty law barred prosecution, but TRC report later basis for the Spanish
extradition request for General Pinochet.
· Chad (1991-92) Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by the
Ex-Predident Habré… Established by the new president to investigate killings (3900 cases), torture and
arbitrary detentions committed by the former regime (1982-1990). 12-16 commissioners operated for
10 months before finalising the 1992 report. First commission to name perpetrators (only so far to
publish photos of the perpetrators) – many of whom were in high offices. No purges or trials.
· Germany (1992-94) Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the
SED Dictatorship in Germany was established by Parliament to investigate human rights abuses in
DDR between 1949 and 89. Composed of political representatives and experts. Focus on political-
historical analysis rather than investigation of individual human righs violations. Academic papers
commissioned and presented at public hearings. 27 commissioners and a staff of around 20 took three
years to complete the lengthy (15 000 page) report. This academic exercise was combined with
individual's right to review own Stasi-files.
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· El Salvador (1992-93) Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was established by the United
Nations as part of the UN moderated peace accord. Staffed and funded entirely by non-nationals.
Broad mandate. The three-member commission and a staff of 15-45 were faced with 22 000 cases of
human rights abuses (disappeared, killed, tortured or kidnapped) committed by both sides of the
conflict (1980-1991). 32 cases were investigated in depth during the 8 months the commission
operated. The 1993 report named perpetrators and made mandatory recommendations. Shortly after
publication of report, amnesty law was passed, but some of the named perpetrators were removed from
positions. Key recommendations were implemented after international pressure.
· Sri Lanka (1994-1997) Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of
persons. Three geographically distinct commissions, each with 3 commissioners and a staff of 5-20,
were established by the President. Mandated to investigate human righs violations in the 1988-1994
period. 20 000 cases were presented to the commissions during their 3 years of operation. Each
commission presented a separate final report. Released after international pressure. Some perpetrators
were named, and several have later been prosecuted. Limited reparations programme.
· Haiti (1995-1996) National Commission for Truth and Justice was established by the President to
investigate human rights violations committed by the former regime (1991-94). 8600 cases were
presented to the commission. 7 commissioners and a staff of 50-100 operated for 10 months. Report
was presented in 1996, and made public a year later. List of perpetrators were included, but not
released. Recommended an international tribunal to try perpetrators.
· Burundi (1995-96) International Commission of Inquiry. Established by the UN Security Council
on request by Burundian government to report on human rights abuses occurring between 1993-1995.
The 5 commissioners  operated for 10 months before presenting their report to the UN in June 1996.
(Due to coup the release was delayed until October.) International prosecution and new commission to
investigate pre 1993-abuses. Renewed violence prevented further action.
· South Africa (1995-2001) Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established by Parliament.
The 17 commissioners were mandated to investigate gross human rights abuses of all sides to the
conflict (1961-1994). Staff of 300, annual budget of UD$18 mill. Strong powers of investigation.
Amnesty for political crimes upon full disclosure. Public, broadcast hearings. Report naming
perpetrators and more than 21 000 victims were published in 1998, after 2,5 years of operation.
Recommendations on reparation policy (partially implemented) and prosecution (not implemented).
Amnesty committee continued hearings. Final report to be submitted end 2001.
· Ecquador (1996-97) Truth and Justice Commission was created by the ministry of Government and
Police to investigate human rights violations between (1979-96). Due to lack of resources and support
the 7-member commission disbanded after 5 months, before finishing report.
· Guatemala (1997-1999) Commission for Historical Clarification was established by the United
Nations as part of the UN moderated peace accord to investigate killings, disappearances, torture and
rape committed by both sides of the conflict (1962-1996). Broad mandate. Cases of 42 275 victims
presented to the commission (which estimated a total of 200 000 were killed or disappeared in the 34
years of armed conflict). The commission operated for 18 months, had 3 commissioners (one
international two nationals) and a staff of up to 200. Restricted reporting powers, no naming of
perpetrators, but documented involvement by "the highest authorities of the State".
Truth Commisions are currently underway or in the process of being established in
Nigeria (1999-), Sierra Leone (2000-), East Timor, Indonesia, Bosnia among others.
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South Africa's TRC as international model
While the Latin American commissions – and in particular Chile’s Truth and
Reconciliation commission (1990) – served as a model for other countries in
the early 1990s, the role of a ‘model truth commission’ was gradually taken
over by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the TRC). It
was established in 1995 and is the most ambitious operation to date both in
terms of powers and resources. The South African commission had several
unique features: It was established by Parliament and mandate was publicly
debated and passed as law.29 Commissioners were selected in a public process.
The commission conducted public and widely broadcast hearings. It had the
power to subpoena witnesses, search premises and seize evidence. And it had
the power to grant amnesty to perpetrators who made a full disclosure.
The large scale, ambitious aims, and public drama surrounding the TRC,
combined with the high public profile of the commissioners (in particular of
the TRC chairman Archbishop and Nobel Peace Price laureate Desmond
Tutu) has generated much attention, political and academic. Numerous
delegations have visited the TRC, and much of the research that has been done
on truth commissions has concentrated on the South African case.30 Although
views differ on the extent to which the South African commission was in fact
successful and whether other countries should follow in its step, few dispute
that it has become “the new standard-setting model of the practice” (Rotberg
and Thompson 2000: 4). It is also the commission that most explicitly
advocated truth telling as a route to national reconciliation. We will therefore
discuss the TRC in some more detail, taking it as a point of departure when
addressing the benefits of truth commissions for reconciliation and
democratisation.31 The main features of South Africa’s TRC are set out in
Table 4.3 below.
                                           
29 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no 34, of 1995.
30 See for example  Asmal, Asmal and Roberts (1997), Boraine (2000a), Christie (2000),
Dyzenhaus (1998), James and Vijver (2000), Jeffery (1999), Mamdani (1996), Meredith
(1999), Nuttall and Coetzee (1998), Rotberg and Thompson (2000), Sarkin (1996), Villa-
Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000), Wilson (2001).
31 For a more thorough discussion on South Africa’s TRC as an international model, see
separate paper (Gloppen 2001).
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Table 4.3 South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
· Established and mandated by Parliament after public debate (The Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act).
· 17 commissioners, ’persons of integrity without high party political profile’ –
demographic balanced, but predominantly pro ANC/government. Selected in open
nomination process, public interviews.
· Staff of more than 300. Budget in excess of USD $35 mill. (cost more than all previous
truth commissions combined). Mainly domestic funding.
· Mandate covered gross human rights violations committed by all sides of the conflict in
the period 1960-1994 (Only acts that were criminal also under apartheid legislation).
· Quasi-judicial powers of subpoena, search and seizure.
· Power to grant amnesty upon disclosure.
· Human Rights Violations Committee (responsible for investigation, documentation and
reporting of violations) conducted public, broadcast victim hearings around the country.
· Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee established to recommend compensation and
restoration for victims and policies to facilitate reconciliation and prevent recurrence.
· Separately appointed Amnesty Committee headed by judges heard amnesty applications,
mostly in public. 7000 applications received, many by convicted criminals, some from
police and military, few from political leaders. About 850 granted amnesty.
· Institutional hearings examining the role of legal system, churches, business etc.
· Witness protection programme established.
· Victim focus. Welcoming environment for victims to tell their story. Comforters engaged
during hearings. But victims support initiatives not followed through.
· Established the identity of more than 20 000 victims. Only these would qualify for
compensation.
· TRC Recommendations were not binding and have largely been ignored by Parliament.
· Compensation was slow and less than recommended, but Parliament contributed 60
million Rands in March 2001
· Unlikely to be prosecutions of perpetrators who failed to apply or were denied amnesty.
· TRC process increasingly politicised. Rejected by most of the opposition as biased.
Criticism by the government for treating human rights violations occurring in the struggle
against apartheid with crimes committed by the regime.
· Drawn-out process. Established 1995. Victim hearings 1996-97. Report submitted late
1998. Amnesty process finalised mid 2001. Final report is yet to be submitted.
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Is truth the road to reconciliation? Lessons from South Africa
The assumption that a process to establish the truth is a necessary step
towards reconciliation  – or at least conducive in this regard – figures
prominently in the debates on transitional justice. But there are also strong
arguments to the opposite – that a process to establish ‘the truth’ of the past is
more prone to perpetrate divisions both at individual and social level and
increase tensions, and that reconciliation rather requires a form of oblivion,
putting the past behind.32 Yet others see the relationship between truth telling
and reconciliation as an empirical question – pointing to empirical evidence to
support both views.33
In the Latin American context the importance of knowing what had
happened and have it publicly recognised was primarily seen to be important
for closure and healing at the individual level. Increasingly, the focus has
shifted, and the value of truth telling for social and national reconciliation is
increasingly emphasised. This is most striking with regard to the South African
TRC. Truth – the Road to Reconciliation was the central TRC slogan,
brought home to though ads and huge banners draped on the wall during the
televised public hearings. And demonstrators compelling apartheid officials to
testify before the TRC carried banners declaring No reconciliation without
truth.
The argument is that by uncovering the facts about past abuses and the
wider set of factors and conditions causing them, and by hearing stories about
the suffering and harm caused, individuals and societies can find closure and
processes of reconciliation and healing take place. Metaphors were drawn
from the medical field: ‘festering wounds must be opened and cleaned out
before healing can occur’, and even more so from religious ideas of ‘confession
as a cathartic process leading to forgiveness and reconciliation’. The central
position of theologians on the commission and among its central ideologues
probably contributed to the centrality of these notions.
The idea of giving and hearing testimony as a cathartic and healing
process for society, made it imperative to facilitate a process whereby not only
victims would come forward, but also perpetrators. In addition to allowing as
many as possible to tell their stories, the process should create as broad a
listening community as possible.
These challenges lead to institutional innovations, some of which are
now often taken as integral to truth commissions as such. Most striking were
the open hearings and the provision that perpetrators guilty of politically
motivated gross human rights violations would be granted amnesty provided
they made a full disclosure to the South African TRC.
                                           
32 The relationship between oblivion and reconciliation is highly disputed, but in most
contexts some form of construction of collective memory (including aspects of selective
remembrance/ forgetfulness) is seen as a central to reconciliation processes. See discussion in
section 7 below.
33 In her comprehensive review of truth commissions, Hayner (2001) notes that advocacy for
truth commissions is often based on the argument that ‘truth is a precondition for
reconciliation’. She finds that this oft-repeated and often uncritically accepted argument does
not, as a general claim, hold up to empirical scrutiny. Without dismissing the thrust of the
argument – or the value of truth commissions – she argues for the need to qualify and
contextualise the assumption that a search for the truth necessarily advances reconciliation.
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Conditional amnesty as incentive for truth telling
Some form of amnesty as a part of a truth commission process was not novel
as such. Many earlier commissions had been conducted in the context of a
blanket amnesty for the former regime, and amnesty is often seen as an aspect
of ‘the truth commission approach’ to transitional justice. It should, however,
be noted that there is no necessary link between the two strategies. Amnesty
has been granted without a truth commission, and materials from truth
commissions have been used in (or available for) subsequent trials.34
What was particular to the South African model of individual,
conditional amnesties, was that it provided an incentive for perpetrators to
contribute information. If they failed to apply for amnesty – and disclose their
actions – they risked prosecution.35  And the risk of exposure increased. In
addition to being accused by victims and witnesses, they could be named by
colleagues applying for amnesty.  Contrary to the expectations of observers,
regarding it as unlikely that those responsible would see this as a credible
threat, amnesty application came in large numbers. Many of the 7000
applications came from convicted criminals with little to loose and much to
win if they could come up with a credible political motive.36 But there were
also a large number of applications from perpetrators – police, military
personnel and people affiliated with the liberation forces, who had actually
committed the crimes. The TRC thus succeeded in uncovering new material
and establishing links of responsibility in a way that previous commissions
generally were unable to do.37
The provisions failed, however, to convince the instigators (the
policymakers and strategists responsible for the planning, and for the
institutional and political framework for the cause of which the human rights
violations were committed). Having much to loose by exposing themselves,
and little to fear, as their responsibility would be difficult to prove, they
generally did not apply for amnesty. Some political parties made submissions
and had their leaders accept a general responsibility for violations committed
in the course of the struggle, but in very few cases did those politically
responsible accept individual responsibility for violations occurring as result of
their own actions or omissions. Although the TRC in some cases managed to
establish links of responsibility all the way to the top of the political hierarchy,
and recommended that a number of political leaders be prosecuted, this is
unlikely to happen. In this sense, the TRC process let the ‘big fish’ off very
lightly, while many of the foot soldiers paid a price in the form of exposure
and public shaming. This may be a cause of resentment among victims and
amnesty-seekers alike. More generally, the integrity of the process is
                                           
34 Most notably in Argentina the truth commission process was combined with trials of those
responsible for the human rights violations of the former regime. Several military leaders were
convicted, although pardons were later given.
35 Other conditions also applied, most notably that the crime had to be politically motivated,
and that the harm should not be disproportionate to the aim. These are known as the
Norgaard principles after the Danish judge who developed them for the Namibian context.
36 Most of these were dismissed. Of the 7000 applications only about 850 were granted
amnesty by October 2000 (TRC –homepage 2001).
37 It should be noted that also previous commissions have succeeded in getting confessions and
testimony from perpetrators, particularly those collecting testimony in closed chambers and
refraining from naming perpetrators. See Hayner (2001).
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jeopardised unless there is a process to hold to account those who did not
apply for, or who were denied amnesty. While conditional amnesty proved to
be a powerful investigative tool, the problems that it raises should not be
overlooked.
Reconciliation through public truth-telling?
The TRC process sought not only to contribute to reconciliation by
compelling perpetrators to disclose their actions – and to do so publicly.38 It
was also central that the stories of victims should be told – and heard – to the
greatest extent possible. The aim was that the entire society should know the
extent of human rights violations committed during the conflict of the past,
and the suffering caused to victims on all sides.
For this to happen, victims had to come forward. To many the
opportunity to relate the stories of their trauma and have it form part of a
public account of the past, was valuable in itself. This is noted also by truth
commissioners taking up statements in camera, and to many victims the public
platform provided by the TRC made this an even more valuable opportunity
(for others publicity would be a barrier, particularly in contexts were this
might cause retribution). That only those identified as victims by the TRC
would qualify for reparation payments, was clearly also an incentive to come
forward.39
Social reconciliation required not only that the stories be told – they also
had to be heard. This required public relation efforts that no previous
commission had undertaken. The TRC held public victim hearings throughout
the country and developed close co-operation with the national media. The
hearings were given extensive coverage, in the daily news, and in weekly TRC
Special Reports on national television.40 Thousands of hours of radio reports
were transmitted from the hearings – several hours daily, and in all the eleven
official languages – providing first hand knowledge also to poor and illiterate
people around the country.
Did this large-scale exercise in public truth-telling advance reconciliation?
The widely broadcasted hearings spread the knowledge and acknowledgement
of apartheid’s atrocities throughout South African society and the TRC was
generally successful in "limiting the range of permissible lies about the past" –
to use Michael Ignatieff's famous phrase. No one could any longer deny that
awful things happened in the apartheid years, that these were not accidents,
but planned activities, or that the state security agencies were involved.
Although few might read the TRC report, everybody knew. The apartheid
regime was discredited among its former supporters and beneficiaries and this
was in itself an important achievement.
While the TRC did not uncover the whole truth about the past, it was
reasonably successful in its investigative efforts. And the facts brought out by
                                           
38  There were provisions for amnesty hearing to be held in camera, but most of the hearings
were public and broadcast.
39 With hindsight, and in light of the fact that reparations have been delayed and are smaller
than expected and recommended by the TRC, it could be argued that also the victims were
compelled to come forward on false pretences.
40 There were 81 programmes, totalling more than 100 hours of prime-time documentary.
These were widely watched.
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the TRC were not widely disputed as such.41 But this did not hinder
politicisation of the commission. Contrary to what might have been expected,
the TRC-truth did not seem to bring reconciliation. A survey in July 1998 –
three months before the TRC handed in its report – indicated that a large
majority of South Africans felt that the process had increased racial tension.
This is no conclusive answer. We don’t know how it will affect long term
processes, or what the situation would have been had the TRC not been
established. Still, in the light of the South African TRC's status as
'international best practice', it is important to acknowledge that, despite its
virtues, it did not become the ‘road to national reconciliation’ that so many
had hoped for. We need to seek answers to why this was so. Should the
process have been organised differently? Or does the underlying assumption
about the 'healing power of truth' just not hold?
Some critics dismiss the TRC's philosophy as empirically unsound. As a
“confusion between moral discourse and socio-political analysis” …
“it is naïve and dangerous to predict that the one (truth) will
necessarily lead to the other (reconciliation), or that amnesty will
necessarily have “a healing effect”. There are perhaps more
factual case studies that demonstrate that truth, such as it is
presented, leads to bitterness, anger, revenge and disillusionment
and that amnesty can lead to a pervasive sense of injustice and
aggrievement” (Adam, Slabbert and Moodley 1997:5-6).
Individual healing and national reconciliation
Another possible problem might be that the assumption about the 'healing
power of truth' is valid only at the individual level. That it was wrongly
assumed that "the process for individual healing matches what an entire
nation must undergo" (Minow 2000: 240). As discussed earlier in the report,
reconciliation is a difficult concept, referring to processes of different kinds
and at various levels. While – politically – the main aim of the TRC was
national reconciliation, to unify the divided South African population, the
process was geared mainly towards individual reconciliation, between victims
and perpetrators, drawing on experience from psychological and religious
counselling. The social and political dynamics of truth telling are thus to some
extent obfuscated.
The political nature of the truth
Truth commissions have in many cases been perceived as a form of vengeance,
a way for new regimes to discredit their predecessors and/or opponents. The
South African TRC, unlike most of the early commissions, was mandated to
investigate gross human rights violations committed by all sides, and took care
to demonstrate ’even-handedness’ by also focussing on ANC related abuses.
Still, the majority of the crimes raised by the victims were attributed to
representatives of the former regime, the white right wing or Inkatha. This –
and the fact that the commissioners were perceived as sympathetic towards the
                                           
41 In some cases there are also disputes over the factual correctness of the material.
C M I
28
new regime – lead to perceptions of the TRC as a ‘witch-hunt’. 42 A process
collectively stigmatising particular parties and population groups, and an
effort to write the authoritative story of the past in a way that favoured the
ANC.43 Criticism was, however, not confined to the opposition. While the
ANC supported the commission and its ‘even-handed’ mandate,44 the support
faded when the report was presented and found the ANC guilty of a number
of violations (albeit only a fraction of what was attributed to the former
regime and Inkatha).45
This shows the importance of recognising the inevitably political nature
of truth commissions and the constraints of the political context on their
operation. The South African attempt to de-politicise the TRC – through
provisions for even-handedness, broad deliberation on the mandate, an open
process of nomination and appointment of a demographically representative
group of ‘people of integrity without a high party-political profile’ – was not
successful. As will be argued below, a commission where the various parties
are directly represented might actually have fared better in this regard. One
reason is simply that truth commission by their very nature can never be
politically neutral.
The central task for all truth commissions is to give an authoritative,
officially sanctioned account of ‘the relevant past’. But in any society – and
particularly in a plural society – the meaning of the past is inevitably contested
and highly political, and history is central to the ongoing struggle for political
legitimacy.
Parties to a conflict normally have different understandings of the past –
of what constitute relevant wrongs and with whom responsibility rests – and
how this reflects on the present and the future. At the same time, there is a
widespread understanding that national reconciliation and democratisation
require some form of reconciliation between the different versions of history.
Hence, truth commissions are given the task of building a collective memory
                                           
42 The National Party, who as the former government was on the receiving end of most of the
allegations made in the hearings, argued from early on that the commission was biased
towards the ANC. It was supported in its critique by the conservative press and aided by some
very unfortunate TRC decisions. (Most notably the granting of amnesty to a group of ANC
cadres without proper disclosure, a decision that was later reversed.) The Inkatha Freedom
Party denounced the Commission as a witch-hunt and refused to co-operate. Left-wing parties
criticised the amnesty-provisions for taking away victims' right to legal redress and to prevent
civil claims for compensation. The Azanian People's Organisation brought a case to the
Constitutional Court to have the Act ruled unconstitutional – but without success.
43 On the TRC as a legitimation exercise see Wilson (2001).
44 Although central leaders, including President Mandela, are known to have been sceptical
that the TRC might increase racial tension. They would have accepted a general amnesty had
the apartheid leaders been willing to apologise for the past and ask forgiveness of the victims.
Many also felt that it was unfair that human rights violations that occurred as part of a just
war against an evil regime should be treated on par with crimes committed by the apartheid
government and its agents. Nevertheless, ANC cadres, including cabinet members, applied for
amnesty. The party handed over documentation and made a lengthy submission to the TRC in
which it took collective responsibility for abuses.
45 The ANC leadership sought a court interdict to stop the publication of the report, which it
failed to get. The incident also revealed the difference in policy and priorities between
President Mandela – who publicly disagreed with his party’s decision – and the current
president Thabo Mbeki who does not share Mandela's emphasis on reconciliation, nor his
loyalty to the TRC.
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of the past repression and its meaning for the future, on the basis on which to
proceed.
For ‘the truth’ to contribute to the process of national reconciliation
truth commissions must negotiate a difficult terrain – and there is little
consensus on what is the best way to go about it. In the current academic
debate warnings are frequently voiced against striving towards ‘the Truth’ or a
common understanding of history. Attempts to give a single, authorised story
of the past – even if every effort is made to be fair and even-handed –
inevitably make some feel that their 'history' is not done justice, and that they
are politically or socially damaged as a result. Even when the authoritative
truth represents a broad consensus it is undemocratic, in the sense that it has a
stifling effect on democratic debate. While national reconciliation may require
a process of working towards more compatible versions of the past, it is
crucial for a democratic society to recognise different voices and distinct
stories.46
Lack of remorse
Some have also argued that a vital link is missing in the truth-reconciliation
logic. As noted above, amnesty applicants had to make a full disclosure and
provide a credible political motive. They did not, however, have to apologise
or show any form of remorse, and few did.
Critics have noted that this undermines the central argument of the TRC
process, namely that of confession leading to forgiveness. To forgive a person
it is not enough to know details of the wrongs committed, or even to hear
from their own mouth what was done and why. If there is no repentance, no
willingness to rectify, such revelations are as likely to harm the relationship as
to contribute to reconciliation. Public apologies – even without full disclosure
– is more likely to lead to reconciliation than truth without contrition (Van
Zyl Slabbert 2000).
Lack of rectification
A related argument is that merely to know the truth is unlikely to lead to
reconciliation as long as the injustices caused by the violations persist
(Hendricks 1996). This is an argument for the primacy of restorative justice –
in which the main problem becomes the failure to implement the reparations
component of TRC process timely and on an adequate scale.
It may, however, also be an argument for a structural focus and reforms
rather than reparations. It is argued that the focus of the TRC is irrelevant for
most of apartheid’s victims. In a context where the majority was victimised by
racist and unjust policies, rather than individual crimes, the focus should have
been less on (the relatively few) perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and
their immediate victims and more on the many beneficiaries and victims of the
apartheid system.47 We return to both of these discussions later.
                                           
46 There is a growing literature on the problems of oblivion, creation and transmission of
memory, (history writing, art, literature, film, music, theatre), see for example Roniger and
Sznajder (1999).
47 This argument is frequently raised in relation to the South Afrian TRC (Mamdani 1996). It
should, however, be noted that the TRC, unlike previous commissions, did attempt to come to
grips with this through conducting institutional hearings, where focus was set on the role of
social institutions (business, the faith communities, the judiciary, the medical profession etc.).
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Is quest for truth a substitute for justice?
It is often argued that truth commissions, at lest to the extent that the
perpetrators are named, represent a form of justice in the sense of social
shaming.48 Thus, it mitigates against impunity in contexts were other forms of
punishment are not feasible.
Critics have argued that the ostracising effect depends on rejection of the
named perpetrator by his or her relevant community. In many divided
societies, those named as perpetrators by a body seen to represent the new
power-holders, are considered heroes or martyrs by their own group (Adam
2001, Moodley and Adam 2000). This can to some extent be avoided if the
commission – as was the case in Chile – is balanced between commissioners
drawn from, or known to be congenial to the old regime and commissioners
supporting the new (alternatively representatives of all the conflicting groups).
The lack of commissioners seen to represent the views of the apartheid regime
(National Party/white right wing) and the Zulu nationalist Inkatha party, is
often cited as a main problem with the South African commission. Regardless
of its efforts at even-handedness (investigation of abuses by all parties to the
conflict), it made the TRC prone to rejection on grounds of bias among those
responsible for the bulk of abuses. It is much more difficult for the different
groups to reject findings supported by their own representatives. This
consideration should weigh heavily, even though it may be more difficult to
reach consensus on conclusion in a politically representative commission.
In a context where the naming of perpetrators does not appear to have a
detrimental effect on their lives – where those publicly known to be
responsible for horrible human rights violations continue to live under
conditions far superior to those of their victims – this is not likely to be seen as
a step mitigating against impunity. Rather, the naming of perpetrators
demonstrates the extent to which serious crimes go unpunished.
Some of those who hold that naming of perpetrators represents a form of
punishment (social shaming, loss of reputation and possibly positions) criticise
truth commissions where perpetrators are named (in public hearings or in the
report) precisely on this ground. Ostracism represents an – often severe – form
of punishment for perpetrators and their families, handed out without the
safeguards that a proper legal process entails in the forms of rules of due
process and probing of testimony though cross-examination (Jeffery 1999).
Apart from the possible punishment effect of truth commissions, they are
frequently held to be a substitute for justice in another sense – namely,
providing a form of restorative justice, more relevant to reconciliation.
                                           
48 See for example the Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(1998), Boraine (2000a).
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5 Restoration and Reconciliation
Is restorative justice the road to reconciliation?
Some argue that what really matters to reconciliation – for the individual and
at the social level – is not retribution through punishment for perpetrators.
Nor is it to know the truth about the past. The important question is whether
steps are taken to address the victims' situation and restore the physical,
psychological, social and economic damage caused by past abuses.
Restorative justice may take different forms, ranging from reparation
payments to victims, via rehabilitation programmes, peace-building projects in
conflict-torn communities, memory projects, and the construction of
memorials.  Table 5.1 provides an overview of the most important restorative
justice strategies and their institutional manifestations.
Table 5.1 Restorative justice strategies
Strategy Institutional mechanism Source
Trial awarding compensation Perpetrator/ Public/
Donor (national or
international)
Truth commission reparation
policy
Reparation payment,
monetary compensation
Administrative reparation
policy
Public/ Donor
Rehabilitation Administrative – public
records, Education
Public/ Donor
Social services to victims
(somatic and psychological
health services)
Truth commission (testimony
as therapy)
Public/ DonorHealing
Traditional practices Local
Trial Perpetrator/
Public
Truth commission Public/ (Perpetrator)
Public apologies Public representatives,
Public/Perpetrator
Acknowledgement
Memorial projects Public/ Donor
Peace-building Conflict resolution
programmes
Local/Public/Donor
C M I
32
Which form of restorative justice that is most likely to advance reconciliation
depends on the context – as does the feasibility of the various approaches.
The most direct form of restorative justice is where those who caused the
harm directly compensate their victims, voluntarily or as the result of a trial.
This may take the form of monetary compensation for loss and damages,
other forms of reparation and/or an apology. In such contexts – particularly
where the restorative measures are forthcoming voluntarily – the argument for
reconciliation is convincing. This requires, however, a situation where the
relationship between perpetrators and victims is individualised and where the
perpetrators have the means to compensate and can be compelled to do so.
When restorative measures by those directly responsible is not an option,
for practical or political reasons, more indirect measures may be employed. In
most cases this is done through public efforts to provide reparation and
rehabilitation for victims. This may be done though some form of reparation
payments (sometimes undertaken on the basis of truth commission reports);
health services for victims who suffer physically or mentally as a consequence
of the past violations; education for victims or their families; public apologies;
and various forms of symbolic restoration, ranging from rectification of public
records to street-names and memorials. The funding may be provided by the
state, by the society through some form of earmarked 'sorry' tax, or by
national or international donors. The feasibility of such efforts, and how
substantial they can be, depend on number of victims, the nature of the harm
and the resources available.
Where there are many victims and limited resources, the healing effect of
symbolic reparations and other non-monetary efforts are often emphasised.
There are also examples, among others from Mozambique, of traditional
practices aimed at healing individuals and communities traumatised by violent
conflict (Hayner 2001, Honwana 1997). As already mentioned, it is also
argued that truth commissions have a restorative effect.
Truth-telling as restorative justice
By giving the victims a public platform to tell their story, a truth commission
(or trial) may function as therapeutic process, providing victims with closure.
Due to the healing effect of testimony, truth-telling processes can be seen as a
form of restorative justice. This was an argument often made in relation to the
South African TRC. Stories coming out of the hearings indicate that some did
experience the process of giving and listening to testimony as healing. But
clearly this was not the case for all.
Psychologists hold that testimony may have a therapeutic effect at the
individual level, but emphasise that for this to be the case there must be a
follow-up process. In South Africa this was not in place. There was no
organised support for victims experiencing post-traumatic stress after reliving
their traumas.
In a situation where the social and economic dispossession caused by
past human rights violations are perpetuated and even grow worse, it is also
difficult to speak of restorative justice if the victim’s situation does not change
in material terms. A quote from an elderly woman speaking to the South
African truth commissioners at a meeting in the Eastern Cape puts it
succinctly:
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"(Y)our lives have changed … it is alright for you to forgive and
embrace the perpetrators of heinous crimes for the sake of
reconciliation. Indeed, it's all right for Nelson Mandela to
forgive since his life has also changed. But our lives have not
changed. We still live in the same shacks… how can we forgive if
our lives have not changed?" (Hendricks 1996).
The TRC commissioners, while insisting that the provision of a platform for
victims to tell their story and have it publicly acknowledged, in itself is a form
of restoration, also emphasises that restorative justice in most cases also
require a material change in the lives of the victims. To the commissioners the
slow and limited political response to their recommendations for reparation
and rehabilitation of victims has been a great disappointment and is seen to
compromise their efforts to provide restorative justice (Orr 2000).
The various efforts at restorative justice raise many questions. One is
whether restoration by the collective (or an external donor) has a similar
reconciliation effect as that paid by the erring part. In cases where violations
were carried out by state agents this may be less of problem, and in any case it
may be argued that the practical help and acknowledgement victims receive is
more important than its source.
A more difficult question is whether restoration of individual victims
likely to lead to social reconciliation at the national level. There are several
reasons why this may not necessarily be the case. To make a material
difference, the reparations must be substantial. Experience shows that where
there has been comprehensive compensation and restoration efforts, these
have tended to be exclusive in the sense that they are confined to a narrowly
defined set of victims, as was the case in Chile. (The 1991 Truth Commission
was followed by significant restoration efforts for those who qualified as
victims, but the criteria excluded many who suffered severe human rights
abuses under the military regime). The problem of defining who should
qualify as victims becomes a controversial and divisive issue.49 It is particularly
difficult in countries where large sections of the population were affected in
some way or other, such as in Eastern Europe or in South Africa.
In this context a focus on restoring the harm caused to a certain group of
victims or particular forms of abuses may cause divisions rather than
reconciliation. It is argued that at least under such conditions it is more
appropriate to adopt a forward-looking approach and focus on reforms that
can address the needs of the population as such, regardless of whether these
needs arise from a particular set of gross human rights violations committed
by one or more group of political agents in a particular period of the past.
                                           
49 Such issues arise at the international level, where the reparation payments to the Jewish
people after the Holocaust has lead to claims from several African states, that transcontinental
slavery be similarly compensated.
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6 Reform and Reconciliation
Proponents of reform or prospective justice as the best route to reconciliation
argue that, at least at the social and national level, reconciliation depend less
on how the past is addressed than on the fairness of the present and future
terms of social co-operation.
This does not mean that past crime and injustice are irrelevant, but
rather that this should be addressed in terms of present needs and levelling of
the playing field, rather than in terms of guilt and entitlement. According to
this logic, social inequality created by past repression is best addressed
through social reform and affirmative action programmes, rather than
individual compensation to victims (identified through more or less arbitrary
criteria). In this perspective, recurrence of human rights violations is best
prevented through carefully institutionalised legal and constitutional reform.50
Is reform a viable route to reconciliation?
The main criticism against the argument for reform as the road to national
reconciliation is that it ignores the need to address the problem of impunity. A
focus solely on prospective justice, letting horrendous crimes by known
perpetrators go unpunished, violates the sense of justice in community and
jeopardises the rule of law.
While this is an argument against reform as the only approach to past
injustice, few would, however, argue against the need for reform as part of a
broader reconciliation strategy. Amnesty (or impunity due to inaction) for
crimes committed by the former regime may be part of a reform strategy, but
it does not necessarily follow. Table 6.1 presents an overview of strategies to
advance reconciliation based on the logic of prospective justice.
Table 6.1. Institutionalising prospective justice
Transitional
justice problem
Human rights problem Institutional response
Create a basis for
peaceful co-operation
Lack of peace, lack of equality Constitution-making
Constitutional/legal reformLack of due process and civil
rights safeguards Reform of the justice system,
capacity-building
Constitutional/legal reform
Prevent recurrence
Lack of political rights to secure
fair terms of participation and
representation
Reform of political institutions –
capacity-building
Right to equality denied Legal reform (anti-discrimination
clauses), affirmative action
Social rights denied Social and legal reforms (health,
education, housing, water…)
Address the legacy of
past repression
Cultural rights denied Legal reform, cultural and
educational programmes
                                           
50 This appears to be the position endorsed by the present South African Government. See also
Gervel (2000).
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The nature of reforms required depend on the social context, of which the
nature of the previous regime is an important element. The important question
is to what extent the human rights of citizens are protected and advanced. The
challenge is to device reforms addressing the shortcomings in the current
human rights situation. From the perspective of prospective justice and
reconciliation, not only the nature and scale of reforms are important. Also
the process through which they are developed and implemented, and how the
necessary resources are provided, matters.
The resources required for the different types of reforms (competence
and finances) may be provided by domestic sources, but are often, at least in
part, provided by international donors. International agents have also often
been central in instigating and shaping the reforms. This, it is argued, has lead
to adoption of blueprints that are not the most suitable for the context and –
even when the reforms may be adequate as such – to a lack of local
ownership. This may hamper the implementation and effectiveness. Strong
external influence may also obstruct processes with potentially important
benefits in terms of reconciliation such as constitution-making and legal
reform. Such processes, when conducted in ways that encourage wide
participation and input from diverse sections of society, enhance dialogue on
the terms of social co-operation that may contribute to national
reconciliation.51
The ambivalent role of international actors in relation to national
reconciliation processes is not only a question in relation to reform strategies.
The dilemmas raised here are even more acute in relation to other measures
undertaken by the international community to address problems of
transitional justice and national reconciliation. We return to this issue below,
but first we want to draw attention to the role of time in relation to
reconciliation processes.
                                           
51 For a discussion of constitution making as nation building see Gloppen (2000).
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7 Time, Oblivion, and Reconciliation
Time affects reconciliation processes in various ways. It is held to be a main
road to reconciliation though oblivion, and it affects the feasibility and
reconciliation potential of other transitional justice strategies.
Oblivion and reconciliation
It is often argued that to forget – to close the door on the past – is a
requirement for reconciliation in the shadow of massive human rights
violations, and that in this process of forgetting past injustice, time is the key
factor. On the basis of this logic – reflecting common sense notions that ‘time
will heal all wounds’ and ‘in a hundred years all is forgotten’ – the inference is
made that the best a new government can do about past human rights
violations in order to advance reconciliation, is – nothing. Public amnesia and
impunity for the perpetrators is the best available route.52
To do nothing about past crimes, and thereby seek reconciliation
through oblivion, should thus be regarded as a separate type of response to the
problem of dealing with past atrocities, a strategy which may or may not, be
combined with reforms. It is a commonly chosen path, particularly in
countries where those responsible for the atrocities continue to command
some form of power.
The two main assumptions underlying this argument are, however,
contentious. It is not clear that oblivion leads to reconciliation. An equally
strong case can be made for the need to remember in order to prevent
recurrence and promote long-term reconciliation. It is also important to note
that processes of remembering and forgetting are selective. What is forgotten
and remembered by the different groups in society will be central to whether
the process reconciles or rather reinforces conflicts and animosity. This brings
us to the second assumption: time produces oblivion. There is much evidence
to demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. Demands to deal with past
crimes often grow stronger over time or only surface decades – even centuries
– after the deeds were committed. The claims for reparation payments raised
in recent years by victims of Nazi-crimes during WWII, is a point in case.
Another current example is the demand for compensation for the damages and
distortions caused by the crime of slavery.53
Temporal distance and the feasibility of transitional justice
strategies
Even if we conclude that time does not – at least not always – produce
oblivion and reconciliation, the time that has passed since the violations
occurred may nevertheless be of great relevance to how past crimes are
                                           
52 Impunity may be explicit through amnesty legislation or an implicit understanding that no
prosecutions will be undertaken.
53 Several African countries raised this issue as part of the process leading up to the UN
Conference on Racism held in Durban, South Africa in September 2001.
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treated. The feasibility of the various transitional justice strategies and their
effects on reconciliation change over time, due to shifting power relations,
changes in public sentiments, or the capacity of the relevant institutions. Thus,
time may make way for options that were closed or deemed too risky at one
stage. In countries as diverse as Chile and Cambodia, trials were ruled out for
decades due to the status of the previous power holders, but once their
position weakened, criminal justice became a real option. 54
We also see that in cases where at one stage international initiatives
stood as the only feasible route to address past crimes, national engagement
becomes stronger and more viable over time. For example, in the former
Yugoslavia there is an increasing demand for national processes to deal with
the crimes of the past, rather than leaving it to the International War Crime
tribunal in The Hague (to which we return below).
In other instances, windows of opportunity close, and the demand for
radical strategies soften. In several cases we have seen that the political will to
rectify past injustice that was manifest in the very first phase after the
transition, fades within a few months or years.
Effects on reconciliation of the duration of the process
The duration of processes of transitional justice also affects their
reconciliatory potential. Experience with truth commissions as well as trials
indicates that if such processes are too drawn-out they may loose momentum
and/or go sour. (Such tendencies are manifest in relation to several of the
processes discussed here, such as the South African TRC, the Ugandan Truth
Commission, the Derg trials in Ethiopia, and the international War Crimes
Tribunals.) With regard to in successor trials (such as the Nazi trials after the
Second World War) sentences also tend to become more lenient with the
passing of time.
World time
A very important aspect of the temporal dimension in relation to transitional
justice strategies is what is often referred to as world time. This denotes the
impact of the external context, both in terms of power relations (geopolitics),
but even more so the norms and ideals that dominate international society
(Zeitgeist). Time in this sense greatly influences the range of strategies open to
domestic actors. The strong involvement of international actors in national
processes to address past human rights violations, can be seen as a direct
manifestation of the current 'world time'.
In sum we may conclude that it is important not to underestimate the
significance of time for reconciliation – and of carefully timing national and
international reconciliation efforts.
                                           
54 The fact that the previous power-holders die may open up new space for reconciliation
strategies. A notable example is the death of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge dictator responsible
for Cambodia's killing fields. His death seems to have been a major factor in opening the way
for negotiations on a joint war-crimes tribunal.
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8 International Actors and National
Reconciliation
An important aspect of world time in the last decade, is an acceleration of a
development which may be characterised as "the globalisation of justice"
(Adam 2001). Where steps are not taken nationally to address gross human
rights violations under a previous regime or conflict (due to institutional
weakness, lack of capacity or will), it is increasingly seen as the responsibility
of the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to
prevent impunity for perpetrators.
This should be seen in relation to developments in international law,
where basic human rights principles are regarded as binding on all states
whether or not these form part of national legislation. It can also be regarded
as a corollary to the principle of humanitarian intervention, stating conditions
under which national sovereignty can be overridden by the right and duty of
the international community to prevent gross violations of human rights.
The principle in itself is not new. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after
WWII set a standard for international reactions to genocide and crimes against
humanity. With the Cold War the ability of the international community –
more concretely the UN and the veto-powers in the Security Council – to react
to such atrocities declined sharply. Only with the changes in the geopolitical
context in the late 1980s was it again becoming possible to forge sufficient
agreement to facilitate joint responses from the international community to
certain grave human rights abuses.
International transitional justice measures may take any of the forms
discussed above. In the various tables and discussions different kinds of
international involvement is indicated (financial and/or technical support, joint
operations, pure international operations). A summary of the main forms of
international efforts to advance transitional justice and national reconciliation
is given in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1. International transitional justice measures
UN Joint UN-
national
Individual
states/ other
international
actors
Cooperation
national /
external
International
Criminal
Court
(not yet
established)
Trials in
national courts
under UN
administration
(East Timor)
Trials in
foreign courts
(Guatemala, Chile
– in Spain.
Rwanda – in
Belgium)
Justice
Ad-hoc war-
crimes
tribunal
(Yugoslavia,
Rwanda)
Joint tribunal
(Cambodia, Sierra
Leone)
Truth Truth
commission
(El Salvador)
Truth
commission
(Guatemala)
Truth
commission
(Rwanda)
Truth
commission
(donor,
technical
support)
Restorative
justice
Advocacy Donor
support for
reparation
policies,
victim support,
peace-building
programmes
Reform Financial and
technical
support for
various reform
processes
Advocacy,
conditionality
Financial and
technical
support for
various reform
processes
In the following sections we will look closer at two types of efforts by which
the international community – through the UN – has sought to step in the
breech where domestic agents have been unable or unwilling to deal with the
crimes and perpetrators of the past. War crime tribunals and truth
commissions, conducted independently by the international community or
jointly with domestic agents, are means by which the UN has explicitly sought
to advance national reconciliation (these are the interventions located in the
top-left quarter of Table 8.1 above).
The advantages and problems of criminal prosecution and truth
commissions discussed previously, obviously also relate to international
efforts, but in this context there are also other factors that need to be taken
into consideration.
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War crime tribunals
Almost 50 years after the end of World War II and the establishment of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the United Nation's Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in May 1993. A year later a second tribunal - the International War
Crime Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) - was established following the massive
killings. Joint tribunals, consisting of domestic as well as international judges
are in the process of being established in Cambodia and Sierra Leone. In East
Timor successor trials are conducted under the auspices of the UN.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The Yugoslavia tribunal, which is located in The Hague, in the Netherlands, is
mandated to prosecute and try alleged perpetrators of serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.55
It is a large and expensive operation. The 14 judges are drawn from as
many countries and the tribunal has a total of 1 103 staff members from 74
countries. The regular budget for 2001 was USD 96 443 900.56 By May 2001,
eight years after the tribunal was established, only 19 people were convicted
(for twelve of these appeals were still pending).57 The first conviction for
genocide came in July 2001. This, and the arrest and eventual extradition of
former President Milosevic to the ICTY around the same time, are arguably
the greatest achievements of the tribunal so far. On the other hand, the
protests against the extradition, and the demands that the former president
first be tried in a domestic court, illustrate the problems with international
tribunals, to which we return shortly.
The International War Crime Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
After the genocide in Rwanda in April – June 1994, where between 500 000
and 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, the UN Security Council
established an international war-crime tribunal to investigate those politically
responsible for the mass-killings. Due to the political situation, and the dismal
state of the Rwandan justice system and infrastructure, the tribunal was set up
in Arusha, Tanzania. The Appeals Chamber is shared between the ICTR and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and sits in The
Hague.
In April 1998, three years after it started operating, the first judgement
was handed down. Former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda was found guilty
                                           
55 The Tribunal is authorised to prosecute and try grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (Article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article
4) and crimes against humanity (Article 5).
56 http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm. Information updated 18 April 2000. Total costs
since the start of the tribunal exceed USD 500 000 000.
57 Since its inception 100 individuals have been publicly indicted. In 18 of the cases all charges
have been dropped or the indictment withdrawn. Nine have died (two whilst in custody at the
UN Detention Unit) and two of the accused have been acquitted. Of the 67 remaining public
indictments, 38 are detained at the Detention Unit and 26 are still at large (three have been
provisionally released).
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of genocide and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.58 This was
the first time a Head of Government was convicted for such crimes. The
tribunal also delivered the first judgements for genocide by any international
court, and was the first court ever to judge rape as a genocidal act, finding
that Tutsi women had been raped with genocidal intent.59
The Tribunal has focused on the individuals alleged to be the ‘big fish’,
the architects and leaders of the genocide.60 Seven trials are completed and all
the eight accused have been found guilty. The policy is that, to the extent
possible, sentences should be served in African countries.
Have the international war-crime tribunals been successful?
Both the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals had reconciliation as an
explicit and central aim.61 The idea is for "'Truth' and 'Responsibility' to pave
the way for understanding and reconciliation" (Holthuis 2001). To what
extent have these efforts been successful?
The process is slow and demanding in terms of resources, and the
tribunals can at best hold a small fraction of the perpetrators to account. The
priority of the international tribunals has been to prosecute the highest
ranking military and political leaders, who had the main responsibility for the
atrocities and "truly endangered international public order". However,
particularly the Yugoslavia tribunal has had grave problems securing their
arrest, even when their whereabouts have been known. Assuming that
criminal justice – accountability and punishment – is necessary for or
conducive to reconciliation, the limited number of alleged perpetrators tried
by the tribunals means that their contribution to reconciliation is limited. This
is a problem also with prosecution in national courts. The process is, however,
                                           
58 It was previously decided that the UN tribunal – unlike the domestic Rwandan courts –
would not impose the death penalty.
59 The mandate of the ICTR, unlike that of the ICTY, includes only the crime of genocide
(Violations of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims).
Rape had so far only been recognised in international law as a crime against humanity and a
war crime.
60 The Rwanda tribunal has been more successful than the ICTY with regard to obtaining the
co-operation of the international community to secure arrests. Of 53 individuals indicted so
far, 47 have been arrested, including former political leaders and high-ranking military
commanders.
61 The stated aim of the Yugoslavia tribunal is “to contribute to restoring and maintaining the
peace. … its mission is to promote reconciliation through the prosecution, trial and
punishment of those who perpetrated war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. By
ensuring that people are held individually responsible for the crimes they committed …
prevent entire groups … from being stigmatised … (E)nsure that others do not resort to acts
of revenge in their search for justice. (N)eutralise the major war criminals and preclude them
from sustaining a climate of hatred and virulent nationalism which will inevitably lead to
future wars. By hearing the voices of the victims in a solemn but public forum, it must assuage
their suffering and help them to reintegrate.... Finally, by establishing the legal truth …
prevent all historical revisionism" Jorda (2001).
Likewise, the purpose of the establishment of the Rwanda tribunal is "to contribute to
the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace in the
region, replacing an existing culture of impunity with one of accountability. Only with the
commitment to justice of the international community can the architects of the Rwandan
genocide… be held legally accountable for their actions. Through the creation of the ICTR,
the international community demonstrates that it will not tolerate crimes of genocide" (ICTR
Fact Sheet No 1 at http://www.ictr.org/).
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even more cumbersome in international tribunals, where it is imperative to
conduct model trials in terms of standards of due process, while
simultaneously building entirely new judicial structures, integrating personnel
from very different legal traditions.
If truth is seen as a foundation for reconciliation, the tribunals have
only provided narrow fractions of 'truth' – in the form of criminal
responsibility of a few individual perpetrators. A broad analysis of the
historical, political, social and economic causes of the conflict is beyond  the
scope of trials. So are other processes of truth telling, deliberation and history-
writing necessary to accomplish "the work of memory required for the
reconstruction of a national identity" (Jorda 2001).
From the perspective of restorative justice for victims the tribunals have
little to offer. They cannot provide a platform to the tens of thousands of
victims. Those who are called upon to deliver testimony in the trial context are
subjected to cross-examination and must single out the narrow aspect of their
experience directly relevant to the issue on trial. The tribunals do not provide
the "presence of sympathetic witnesses" believed to be crucial to individual
reconciliation (Minow 2000). Nor do these tribunals offer the victims any
right to claim compensation. Certain efforts have been made, however. The
Registry of the ICTR has pioneered advocacy for a victims-oriented restitutive
justice, to complement the retributive justice against perpetrators handed
down by the tribunals.62 A Support Programme for Witnesses and Potential
Witnesses has been established to support NGOs providing legal,
psychological, medical and limited rehabilitation assistance to Rwandan
witnesses and potential witnesses at the Tribunal. The establishment of an
outreach programme is another effort to increase the impact of the tribunal’s
work inside Rwanda and foster national reconciliation.63
The tribunals have to a large extent succeeded in meeting world class
standards of due process (respecting rights of the accused to a fair trial and
protection against degrading and inhumane treatment, dismissing the death
penalty etc.), while at the same time proving capable of securing convictions.
The relative success of the tribunals according to the standards of the
international community does, however, not necessarily mean that they have a
positive effect on national reconciliation processes. This holds particularly true
for the Rwanda tribunal.
For one, most observers note that the Arusha trials have received little
attention in the Rwandan public. And to the extent that they do, the prestige
and effort that goes into these remote and first-world-standard trials is often
seen as offensive. The superior treatment given to the Arusha ‘big fish’
detainees as compared to the standards for those incarcerated within the
country64 and the absence of capital punishment (which has frequently been
imposed to less prominent perpetrators tried inside the country), have evoked
criticism. This adds to the lack of legitimacy that the UN and the international
                                           
62 Several non-governmental organisations and some Governments have pushed for the
inclusion of a similar framework in the statute of the proposed permanent International
Criminal Court, and a Trust Fund for victims is provided for in the ICC Rome Statute.
63 ICTR/INFO-9-13-018, Press briefing by K. C. Moghalu, Spokesman for the ICTR, The
Hague, 19 October 2000, at http://www.ictr.org/.
64 Rwanda is trying to set up an alternative legal system to speed up trials of genocide suspects
and reduce overcrowding in the country's prisons.
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community have in Rwanda, partly due to the inaction and lack of concern
experienced in the face of the genocide.
Another obvious problem is the financial cost. To establish and run a
complex international institution based in Arusha and Kigali – including three
modern and fully equipped courtrooms, translation, library and research
facilities, and the first ever detention facility to be set up and run by a UN
body – has incurred millions of dollars in costs for each of the accused in the
Rwanda Tribunal. This stands in stark contrast to the 120 000 or so alleged
perpetrators who are detained in over-crowded jails inside Rwanda, awaiting
trial before an overloaded and in all respects under-resourced Rwandan
judiciary.
In the former Yugoslavia there is also criticism of the tribunal, which to
some extent is seen to compete with national processes and hamper domestic
reconciliation initiatives. Conflicts of jurisdiction – and interests – between the
international tribunal, local courts and a planned truth commission manifested
themselves most clearly in relation to the demands for, and eventual
extradition of, President Milosevic to the International Tribunal in The Hague
and in the debate regarding a truth commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
As the limitations of the International Tribunals, and trials more
generally, as means to reconciliation have become more apparent, the calls for
a truth commission have gained wide support.65 The ICTY has been highly
critical of the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, more or
less along the lines of the South African TRC, to complement its work. There
are fears that it would render witnesses useless, detract attention and resources
from the Tribunal and generally undermine its work, particularly if some form
of amnesty provisions were to be included.66 The ICTY view has been that the
Tribunal-process should have priority and that a potential future truth
commission process should wait, or be carefully geared towards enhancing the
work of the Tribunal.67 That this view is not shared by those who support a
truth commission is not surprising, given that the slowness of the ICTY
                                           
65 It should be noted that many Latin American countries have moved in the opposite
direction. The initial truth commissions of the 1980s and 90s are perceived as inadequate, and
in countries such as Argentina and Chile, trials are now underway.
66 "(C)onfessions must in no way lead to an amnesty as was authorised, for instance, before
the truth and reconciliation commission set up in South Africa at the end of the apartheid
years. Amnesty in fact runs up against fundamental moral problems, infringes the very
mission of the International Tribunal and calls into question a major accomplishment of these
last years – the refusal to grant immunity for offences like war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide" (Jorda 2001).
67 The view of the representatives of the ICTY is that "Having a criminal process in place to
deal with those serious violations of international humanitarian law means that truth-seeking
mechanisms, which work against the very principles upon which that criminal process is
based, must be avoided. … National initiatives to understand the past should not become an
impediment to the flow of information to feed the criminal process… Arresting indicted
criminals and transferring them to the seat of the Tribunal is, in my view, an act of truth
seeking, and therefore, in the end, reconciliation in itself. Much the same applies to all
initiatives that help create a climate in which the International Tribunal and its work are
understood… At the same time, it can be envisaged that data which has been gathered by the
Tribunal and the judicial determinations it has reached in the course of the criminal process
should become part of national truth-seeking initiatives" (Holthuis 2001). See also Jorda
(2001).
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process and its limited local legitimacy are central driving forces in the
establishment of such a commission.
Given the increase in international and domestic instruments to address
the problems of transitional justice, this situation – where demands for a truth
commission arise amidst an ongoing process of criminal justice, or where
international and local courts or tribunals compete for jurisdiction – is prone
to arise more often. The question of whether and how to combine various
institutional mechanisms and processes to further reconciliation should thus
be given careful and principled consideration.
In light of the local criticism of the international tribunals, a central
question becomes for whom do they really matter. At this point in time, both
tribunals seem to be more important for the international community and the
UN – demonstrating ability to act to enforce the standards of international
law – than to national reconciliation processes.
The costs of international tribunals combined with the extent of local
criticism and lack of ownership are factors fuelling the search for other
strategies. One important development over the past few years has been the
adoption of a convention to establish a permanent International Criminal
Court.
International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court responds to two main problems with the
international tribunals. Firstly, it explicitly aims to complement rather than
substitute local processes, thus avoiding some of the jurisdictional problems
and conflicting interests that have surfaced with regard to the ad-hoc
tribunals. Secondly, the hope is that it will be a way to economise and make
future operations less costly by utilising and take care of the skills and
resources developed by the ad-hoc tribunals, not least by the ICTY and the
appellate chamber in the Hague.
It is 50 years since the United Nations first recognised the need to
establish an international criminal court. The 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide identified genocide as "a
crime under international law" for which alleged perpetrators "shall be tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction".68
The International Law Commission was asked to consider “the desirability
and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ” for such
purposes and concluded that an international court was indeed both desirable
and possible. Statutes were drafted by 1951 but the General Assembly
postponed consideration of the draft statute pending the adoption of a
definition of aggression. The question came up periodically but due to the
Cold War it was only in December 1989, that the International Law
Commission again was asked by the General Assembly to resume work on an
international criminal court.
In 1993 the conflict in the former Yugoslavia erupted, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide commanded renewed international
attention. The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was established (see discussion above) and shortly thereafter, the
                                           
68 UN Resolution 260, 1948.
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draft statute for an international criminal court was completed. It was
submitted to the General Assembly in 1994 and in April of 1998 the drafting
of the text was completed. Two months later the UN Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
was convened in Rome where the convention was adopted in July 1998.
Representatives of 139 countries signed, while the USA decided against it.69 60
countries have to ratify the convention in order for the ICC to be established.
So far it is ratified by 32 countries.70
Joint international/national tribunals
Another development responding to the problems of excessive costs and lack
of local ownership, is the move towards joint tribunals where national and
international judges serve on the same panels. These are not necessarily less
costly than international ad-hoc tribunals, but the value added in the form of
competence building in the domestic judiciary is seen to render them more
cost-effective. The stronger national involvement may stem some of the local
criticism and create ownership in the process among domestic actors.
Jurisdictional problems are also less prone to arise, as are problems of
different standards for different types of perpetrators. This may have positive
effects on the legitimacy of the process and on institutionalisation of the rule
of law, which in turn may lead to reconciliation and democratisation. In
addition to the two processes outlined below, a joint tribunal is in the
planning stage to deal with abuses in Indonesia/East Timor. In East Timor the
steps taken by the local judiciary, under UN control, to bring the perpetrators
to justice can also be seen as a form of joint process.
Cambodia
After almost a year of talks an agreement was reached in June 2000 between
the UN and the government of Cambodia on a plan to establish a tribunal to
try Khmer Rogue leaders who organised the 1975-1979 genocide that killed at
least 1.7 million people, approximately 20 per cent of the population. This
followed a long period of foreign pressure, in particular from the US, to hold
the former regime to account. Still, the move would probably have been
politically impossible for the Cambodian leadership if not Pol Pot, the former
Khmer Rouge leader, had died in 1998. Another reason for the drawn-out
process is that China, the main backer of the Khmer Rouge when it ruled
Cambodia, has opposed the establishment of a war crimes tribunal. Since
China is among the veto powers in the UN Security Council, this blocked the
possibility of an international tribunal based on a Security Council resolution.
In January 2001, the Cambodian National Assembly, after months of
deadlock over what form the trials should take, approved legislation providing
for a tribunal that will include foreign judges and prosecutors. To allay
concerns that foreign judges and prosecutors would override Cambodian
sovereignty, a formula was agreed where Cambodian judges are to be in
majority at each level of the proposed court – but where at least one
                                           
69 President Clinton signed the convention 30.11.2000, on his last day of office, but prospects
for ratification by Congress are meagre, as there is little political support for an International
Criminal Court without a veto for the US.
70 Source: http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm
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international judge must side with them for a judgement to be valid. Only top
leaders and people directly responsible for the genocide will be tried and the
death penalty cannot be imposed. The Senate passed the legislation in August
2001, but it still needed Royal approval.71 There are speculations that the
King- despite his stated intention to sign the bill into law – might still hesitate
to go against the will of the Chinese.72
Due to slow progress and what the UN saw as stalling on the part of the
Cambodian government, the process derailed, and as of March 2002, there is
no formal process to bring the tribunal forward.
Sierra Leone
In August 2000, the UN Security Council, on US initiative, approved the
establishment of a special international court to try Sierra Leone rebels
accused of war crimes in the nine-year-old war – fought mainly for control of
the country's lucrative diamond mines – that has decimated the West African
country. Tens of thousands of people – overwhelmingly civilians – have been
killed. Foday Sankoh and his rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front, are
believed to be responsible for the great majority of human rights abuses.
Rebels are reported to have amputated hands, ears or other body parts from
thousands of civilians whom the guerrillas suspect of sympathising with the
government (Lynch 2000).
The Resolution calls upon the UN Secretary General to negotiate an
agreement with the government of Sierra Leone to create an independent
special court. The court will be a hybrid of international and domestic Sierra
Leonian law and will try crimes against humanity, war crimes and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The appeals chamber is likely to be
shared with the ICTR and ICTY.
While joint tribunals may increase the capacity and integrity of the local
judiciary and overcome some of the problems of the ad-hoc tribunals,
particularly related to local awareness and ownership of the process, other
problems are likely to be exacerbated. The quality of the tribunals will to a
large extent depend on the state of the local justice system and the
qualifications, skills and independence of the domestic judges. Many of the
problems and issues discussed previously also remain – such as the questions
raised concerning the reconciliation effect of retributive justice, and the limited
ability of the judicial apparatus to attend to the victims' need for
acknowledgement and restoration. While these tribunals might theoretically be
more cost efficient, the problem of how to get the funding remains. There are
substantial costs involved and a donor fatigue seems to be spreading among
the (relatively few) countries traditionally contributing to these kinds of
requests.
The problems of funding is less acute in relation to UN involvement in
truth commission processes, simply because these are less costly. But also in
this context there are dilemmas regarding how to create local legitimacy and
                                           
71 BBC, 2 January, 2001 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_1096000/1096866.stm
72 China is believed to have put pressure on the Cambodian government to delay the trials, but
Cambodian Representatives denied this. BBC, Saturday, 19 May, 2001 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_1339000/1339371.stm
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ownership for the process, while avoiding problems of bias and lack of
institutional independence.
Truth commissions
The establishment of a truth commission was part of UN-brokered peace
accords both in El Salvador (1991) and in Guatemala (1994/97)73.
The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was appointed and
administered by the UN and funded by UN member states. The three
commissioners were respected international figures and no Salvadorans were
included on the staff (Hayner 2001). After a thorough process of investigation
and collection of evidence, the commission published a highly critical report
where it blamed the government and its agents for 95 per cent of the abuses
and naming dozens of perpetrators.74 The new, civilian-lead government
reacted by criticising the failure of the report to meet the needs of national
reconciliation "which is to forgive and forget the painful past" (Hayner 2001:
40), and five days later it released a sweeping amnesty law. Several of those
who were named in the report were, however, subsequently removed from
their positions, and several of the reforms recommended by the commission
were adopted and implemented after strong international pressure.
In Guatemala the national involvement was stronger, with both
international and domestic commissioners and staff. The military insisted that,
unlike in El Salvador, perpetrators should not be named. The commission
concluded, however, that the Guatemalan State had committed acts of
genocide against groups of Mayan people and that the "majority of human
rights violations occurred with the knowledge or by the order of the highest
authorities of the state" (cited in Hayner 2001: 48). The truth commission's
report was later submitted as back up for a case filed in a Spanish court
against the Guatemalan president of Congress.
The reconciliation effect of international measures for transitional
justice
The role of the international community in relation to transitional justice  –
and the effects of such measures on national reconciliation processes – is
difficult to isolate and determine. What is clear, however, is that international
interventions are controversial. A main cause of controversy is the
arbitrariness with which the international community acts. While the
geopolitical context does not prevent all forms of actions, it clearly influences
the cases in which international action for transitional justice is an option. As
discussed above, it is also a problem for international mechanisms to gain
legitimacy and support locally. They are often perceived as geared more
towards the needs of the international community than the local context, and
in many cases they appear to have little effect on processes of national
reconciliation. Critical judgements by international tribunals or commissions
                                           
73 The commission was originally agreed to in Oslo in June 1994, but only when the final
peace accords were signed three years later could the commission start its work (Hayner
2001).
74 It was, however, criticised for failing to report on the role of US support to the Salvadoran
government during the 12-year war.
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are more easily discarded than when they come from respected ‘insiders’.
Local ownership of transitional justice processes is crucial to reconciliation,
and to find ways to administer international support that is more suited to this
aim is a major challenge.
It is, however, still early days to assess the international engagement in
this field. Of the efforts undertaken by the UN to establish transitional justice
mechanisms, the two truth commissions discussed above (El Salvador and
Guatemala) are the only ones yet completed. The rest are ongoing, and only
the two ad hoc war crime tribunals have been in operation for long enough to
warrant an assessment of their effects on reconciliation. Of the two truth
commissions the Salvadorian commission seems to have had the most
profound impact on the society – despite the fact that this commission, unlike
the Guatemalan, was fully staffed, administered and funded by the UN. This
indicates that while local participation and ownership is central, this may also
be achieved by international mechanisms. More generally, the truth
commissions have not experienced problems of rejection by the local
community on near the same scale as the tribunals. One reason for this may be
the pace at which these processes proceeded. The commissions have lasted for
6-12 months, while the tribunals have been in operation for 6-8 years and are
nowhere near their completion. This increases risks on politicisation and is not
necessarily positive. It should be noted that while the truth commissions have
had a set time frame, this has not been the case with the tribunals. How and
when to end such international engagements is in itself a difficult and
potentially divisive issue.
What determines UN response?
At the level of principle, the UN acts in situations of transitional justice where
the country itself is unable to address its problems of impunity for gross
human rights violations due to lack of capacity, resources, or will. But the UN
clearly does not act in all such situations, and the scale of violations does not
go a long way towards explaining when the international society intervenes.
This is easier to understand on the basis of pragmatics and realpolitik.
We have noted the debilitating impact of the Cold War on international action
to impose justice in contexts where crimes against humanity otherwise go
unpunished. Also in the present situation the geopolitical situation, goes a long
way towards explaining why tribunals and truth commissions are established
in certain contexts and not in others. The interests of powerful countries in the
region in question, and of the veto powers of the UN Security Council, weigh
heavily. 75
Financial considerations clearly also play a role. It is generally a small
group of countries that contributes money for such initiatives, and it is
becoming more difficult to find the funds. While there seems to be something
of a general ‘tribunal fatigue’, it is clearly more difficult to raise funds for
some countries and regions than for others.
                                           
75 An international tribunal or truth commission to address human rights violations related to
the Russian warfare in Chechnya, for example, is not an option (Adam 2001).
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9 Assessing Responses to Past Human
Rights Abuses
In this report we have presented an overview of institutional strategies to deal
with the problem of past atrocities and the main debates and dilemmas raised
by these efforts, as reflected in the transitional justice literature. The picture is
complex. The relationship between the aims of reconciliation and
democratisation and the different measures employed to achieve them – trials,
purges, truth commissions, restorative efforts, reforms, amnesty and amnesia –
are in most cases ambiguous and disputed. Sophisticated moral and theoretical
reasoning is provided in support of each strategy as a road to reconciliation,
but in many cases the relationship can not, or at least has not, been
convincingly demonstrated empirically.
Lessons learned
Lessons that can been drawn from the discussions are, firstly, that there is no
single superior strategy or institutional model for addressing the problem of
past human rights violations. Each particular case must be addressed on its
own terms and in this process the power context and the nature of the
repression are central factors that need to be taken into consideration in the
search for a suitable approach.
Secondly, the timing is important. It is not enough to construct the
optimal institutions for addressing a specific transitional justice problem; it is
also a matter of introducing them at the right time. A measure that is ruled out
at one stage may become an option later on.
Thirdly, local ownership and legitimacy is absolutely crucial. This can
come about in various ways, but is often related to the process through which
the transitional justice institutions are established. It is, in other words, not
only a matter of what is done and when, but how and by whom. Experience
with international and UN engagement in tribunals and truth commissions is
mixed, and the UN factor is difficult to isolate. Strong and direct international
engagement – particularly when combined with physical distance – does,
however, appear to make the process of generating legitimacy more difficult.
Fourthly, we see that one strategy is rarely sufficient. In several countries
that have undergone truth commission processes, pressure for trials has
resurfaced at a later stage (Chile, Argentina). In countries starting out with
trials, domestic or international, the pressure for a truth commission has
gradually evolved (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Claims for compensation are raised
in various contexts, and demands for reform are near universal.
Two more general lessons can be drawn from this pattern. On the one
hand, it is clear that each society needs to search, not for the road to
reconciliation, but for paths traversing different parts of the war torn social
terrain. On the other hand, it is equally clear that for most societies
traumatised by gross human rights violations reconciliation is not a
destination, but an ongoing process. It is naive to believe that transitional
justice institutions, however sophisticated, can bring reconciliation once and
for all.  The challenge should thus be conceived not in terms of finding the
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formula, or set of formulae, that will deliver reconciliation, but rather to
search for tools and procedures that can facilitate various forms of
reconciliation processes and keep them going. Rather than to look for the road
to reconciliation, we should seek ways to construct roads or paths of
reconciliation.
Recommendations, research needed
With the massive resources dedicated to reconciliation processes of various
kinds, there is a need to study their impact, critically and open-mindedly. It is
necessary to know more about how effective they are in advancing their
immediate aims, which calls for empirical research into whether the strategies
that are introduced to advance reconciliation achieve their purpose, and which
strategies are most effective.
More should also be known about how different reconciliation efforts and
processes affect each other on the ground, and how they in fact impact on
democratisation. As discussed, the literature often assumes a close, symbiotic
relationship between national reconciliation and democracy, where the one is
defined in terms of the other. It is thus difficult to test the assumption that
reconciliation is necessary for democracy, and vice versa. Reconciliation at the
individual and community levels is, however, normally understood in ways
that are analytically distinct from the definition of democracy, which means
that the relationship between the two can be subjected to empirical probing. In
other words, the question “Given that aims regarding reconciliation at
individual (community) level are achieved, has this proven to be favourable to
national reconciliation and democratisation?” can and should be investigated.
We also need to know more about why states chose particular
transitional justice strategies and the factors that influence and restrain their
choice. Some work has been done, focussing in particular on the power of the
former regime to prevent reactions, and the strength of civil society in pushing
for them (Skaar 1999b). Still, there is a need for a better theoretical
framework to help us understand why states (and the international
community) act they way they do. We need to better understand how the
suitability of different strategies is affected not only by political factors but
also by differences in the cultural context. This in turn require more, and more
systematic, knowledge about the strategies that states have in fact pursued.
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